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ECONOMIC THEORY, DIVIDED INFRINGEMENT, AND 
ENFORCING INTERACTIVE PATENTS 
W. Keith Robinson* 
Abstract 
High tech companies—especially in the emerging areas of the Internet 
of Things, wearable devices, and personalized medicine—have found it 
difficult to enforce their patents on interactive technologies. Enforcement 
is especially difficult when multiple parties combine to perform all of the 
steps of a claimed method, which is referred to as joint or divided 
infringement. Because of this difficulty, some commentators advocate 
that “interactive” patents susceptible to divided infringement should not 
be enforced at all. 
In contrast, this Article argues that economic theory supports the 
enforcement of interactive patents. Previous papers have analyzed 
divided infringement problems from a doctrinal and policy perspective. 
This Article is the first to analyze divided infringement from an economic 
perspective using economic theories of the patent system. 
Uniquely, all three prevalent economic theories of the patent system—
(1) reward theory, (2) prospect theory, and (3) rent-dissipation theory—
support the enforcement of interactive patents. Reward theory is 
consistent with enforcing the rights of interactive patents so long as the 
patent system balances the social cost with the social benefit of 
interactive technologies. Prospect theory recommends enforcing 
interactive patents where it would promote an inventor’s ability to 
commercialize her invention free from direct competition. Finally, rent-
dissipation theory suggests enforcing interactive patents if enforcement 
will effectively reduce the dissipation of patent rents. 
 Viewing interactive patent enforcement through the lens of these 
economic theories reveals how doctrinal tests for divided infringement 
may align with the economic goals of the patent system. Although the 
doctrinal test for divided infringement will likely continue to evolve, 
start-ups and disruptive, hi-tech companies that own interactive patents 
should find some comfort in the notion that the economic underpinnings 
of the patent system support enforcement of their interactive inventions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you own a small business that processes financial 
transactions. Your company is responsible for implementing one aspect 
of this multistep process. That step is to collect payment information from 
merchants and then forward that information to a debit network.1 
Business is going well when a patentee sues you for patent infringement. 
The asserted patent purports to cover the entire financial transaction 
process, in which you only play a small role.2 Should you be liable for 
patent infringement?3 Moreover, should the merchants, the debit 
network, the banks, and all the other parties involved in the transaction 
also be liable for patent infringement?4  
                                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P. (BMC Resources), 498 F.3d 1373, 1375–
76 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (describing a PIN-less debit bill payment system in which the defendant, 
Paymentech, was responsible for routing customer payment information to a participating debit 
network), overruled by Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai/McKesson I), 
692 F.3d 1301, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014). 
 2. See, e.g., BMC Resources, 498 F.3d at 1376–77 (listing the patent claims for paying 
bills asserted against Paymentech). 
 3. See Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 MINN. L. REV. 
72, 117 (2012) (arguing that the modern patent infringement analysis is becoming more 
unmanageable and complex, and the issue of joint or divided infringement is an example of this 
trend); see also W. Keith Robinson, No “Direction” Home: An Alternative Approach to Joint 
Infringement, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 109–12, 115 (2012) [hereinafter Robinson, No “Direction” 
Home] (arguing for determining if there should be divided infringement liability based on whether 
multi-party interaction was an innovative concept of the patent). But see Mark A. Lemley et al., 
Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 272–73 (2005) (explaining that claims can be 
drafted to capture the activity of a single entity and avoid the divided infringement complications 
that arise when a claim requires the actions of more than one party). 
 4. See Dolly Wu, The Use of Use for Patented Systems in a Single or Joint Infringement 
World, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 514, 545–46 (2013) (explaining that, for system claims, 
most courts find that joint infringement can occur); Simone Rose, Further Reflections on 
Extinguishing the Fountainhead of Knowledge: A Call to Transition to the “Innovation Policy” 
Narrative in Patent Law, 66 SMU L. REV. 609, 624–29 (2013) (arguing that in the wake of 
disruptive technologies, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit should adopt nuanced 
and flexible standards for evaluating patentability and enforcement questions); Andrew Chin, 
Alappat Redux: Support for Functional Language in Software Patent Claims, 66 SMU L. REV. 
3
Robinson: Economic Theory, Divided Infringement, and Enforcing Interactive
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1964 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
Now imagine that you are the founder of a start-up that makes 
software for tracking customer information and performing billing. For 
strategic purposes, you form a partnership with a separate company that 
makes logistics software.5 Your partner’s software tracks customer orders 
and deliveries. Together, you both modify your respective software so 
that it works together.6 Your companies market and sell the software 
together as a unit to customers looking for an end-to-end solution.7 
Unfortunately, a competitor has a patent on a similar integrated solution 
and sues you and your partner for patent infringement.8 Unlike in the first 
example, here you have purposefully joined forces with another company 
to create a product and service. Does this make a difference? Should you 
or your partner be liable for patent infringement?9 
In both cases the answer has been unclear until very recently.10 The 
federal statutes covering patent infringement offer little help in these 
situations.11 If a single person performs each and every step of a method 
claim, then they are liable for direct infringement.12 In the alternative, a 
party is liable for induced infringement if it aids or abets another in 
infringing a patent.13 However, the statute is silent as to how liability 
might attach when multiple parties’ combined actions perform all of the 
steps of a claimed method.14 This scenario is commonly referred to as 
                                                                                                                     
491, 491–94 (2013) (discussing the problem of software claim scope that applies to many claims 
susceptible to divided infringement). 
 5. See, e.g., Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (explaining that the defendants, emsCharts and Softtech, “formed a strategic 
partnership, enabled their two programs to work together, and collaborated to sell the two 
programs as a unit”). 
 6. See id. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. at 1369–71 (describing Golden Hour’s claimed system for managing information 
in connection with emergency medical transportation). 
 9. See Long Truong, After BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P.: Conspiratorial 
Infringement as a Means of Holding Joint Infringers Liable, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1897, 1918–19 
(2009) (arguing that a legal loophole encourages actors to avoid infringement by entering into 
conspiracies to avoid liability).  
 10. See Janis & Holbrook, supra note 3, at 117; Wu, supra note 4, at 545–46; see also 
Akamai Techs., Inc v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai/McKesson III), 797 F.3d 1020, 1025 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam) (expanding the test for liability for divided infringement 
to include where actors form a joint enterprise and finding that the evidence supported the 
conclusion that the defendant, Limelight, directed or controlled its customer’s performance of the 
asserted method steps). 
 11. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a)–(c) (2012) (stating the statutory rules for direct infringement, 
induced infringement, and contributory infringement). 
 12. Id. § 271(a). 
 13. Id. § 271(b). 
 14. See id. § 271.  
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divided or joint infringement.15 Since 2007, whether there should be 
liability for divided infringement has been at the center of an ongoing 
debate between patent attorneys, inventors, and the courts.16 
In response to the lack of guidance in the patent statute, several 
doctrinal proposals for determining divided infringement liability have 
emerged within the past eight years.17 Plaintiffs in analogous cases have 
argued that liability should depend on the type of connection between the 
defendant and the other entities involved.18 In contrast, defendants have 
argued against divided infringement liability, contending that liability for 
                                                                                                                     
 15. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P. (BMC Resources), 498 F.3d 1373, 1379–80 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (explaining that divided infringement specifically deals with whether a party can 
be liable for infringement when they participate or encourage infringement but do not directly 
infringe), overruled by Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai/McKesson I), 
692 F.3d 1301, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014). 
 16. Third party liability for patent infringement is broadly governed by statutes setting forth 
contributory infringement and inducement. However, as evidenced by the Federal Circuit’s 
decisions, the claims at issue in divided infringement cases have revealed a disconnect between 
direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), and what type of behavior is covered by 
contributory infringement and induced infringement in § 271(b) and (c). See generally 
Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d at 1305–06. The doctrine of divided infringement touches on 
several key issues for the patent bar. One of these issues is claim drafting. In several divided 
infringement cases, the Federal Circuit has said that it will not rewrite poorly drafted claims. See 
Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d at 1349–50 (“As many amici have pointed out, the claim drafter is 
the least cost avoider of the problem of unenforceable patents due to joint infringement, and this 
court is unwise to overrule decades of precedent in an attempt to enforce poorly-drafted patents.”); 
BMC Resources, 498 F.3d at 1381 (“Nonetheless, this court will not unilaterally restructure the 
claim or the standards for joint infringement to remedy these ill-conceived claims.”); Sage Prods., 
Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[A]s between the patentee who 
had a clear opportunity to negotiate broader claims but did not do so, and the public at large, it is 
the patentee who must bear the cost of its failure to seek protection for this foreseeable alteration 
of its claimed structure.”). This highlights a deeper concern of some within the patent bar that 
claim drafting is a lost art. Notably, Professor Hal Wegner has called for the return of a claim 
drafting exercise to the patent bar exam. See Harold C. Wegner, Limelight, Wordsmithing and 
Patent Licensure (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ipfrontline.com/ 
downloads/WordsmithingJuly8REV.pdf. Another reason why divided infringement cases are so 
interesting has to do with the technology described in the patents at issue. Several of the cases 
deal with “internet age” inventions. This is technology designed to exploit the Internet’s 
infrastructure to facilitate communication between several people or devices. See, e.g., BMC 
Resources, 498 F.3d at 1375. An extension of this application is the use of wireless technology. 
In addition, several companies have articulated concern about what impact the divided 
infringement doctrine will have on personalized medicine, biotechnology, and other technology 
areas where process patents are sought to protect innovation. See infra Section I.B.  
 17. See generally Robinson, supra note 3, at 77–84 (explaining that the Federal Circuit has 
mulled over a test for applying the divided infringement doctrine, which has continuously changed 
since it was first used in 2007). 
 18. See, e.g., Janis & Holbrook, supra note 3, at 90 (explaining that everyone is a potential 
infringer); BMC Resources, 498 F.3d 1373 at 1380 (stating BMC’s argument that the type of 
connection required to show divided infringement is participation and combined action).  
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direct infringement requires that a single entity perform all the steps of 
the claimed method.19 Several commentators have argued that, in lieu of 
any new legal standard, the entire problem of divided infringement can 
be resolved by encouraging patentees to draft clearer claims.20 Others 
have argued that if alleged infringers conspire to infringe a patent, the law 
should provide a remedy.21 
The problem of divided infringement raises an interesting question 
about patent enforcement.22 That is, once the patent office has granted a 
patent, how should the patent system manage a patentee’s ability to 
enforce its patent against potential infringers? Economic theory provides 
an interesting perspective on patent enforcement considerations. For 
example, commentators have attempted to use economic theory to 
explain the court’s decisions with respect to nonobviousness 
determinations.23 This type of exercise can be valuable. Economic theory 
can help explain and predict court decisions in patent infringement cases. 
Further, economic theory can suggest whether the current patent 
enforcement mechanisms align with the economic function of the patent 
system.  
So, should the patent system enforce interactive claims that are 
susceptible to divided infringement? Through the lens of three economic 
theories of the patent system—reward theory, prospect theory, and rent-
dissipation theory—this Article argues that economic theory supports the 
enforcement of interactive patents. Further, it argues that economic 
theory explains the myriad of tests that have been proposed by judges on 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to determine divided 
                                                                                                                     
 19. See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Unblocked Future: Why Gene Patents Won’t Hinder 
Whole Genome Sequencing and Personalized Medicine, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1601, 1629 (2012) 
(explaining that a genetic sequencing company seeking to avoid infringement of interactive 
method claims would choose to provide results without any comparison or interpretation and leave 
it to an independent physician to interpret them). 
 20. See, e.g., Lemley et al., supra note 3, at 272–73 (explaining that claims can be drafted 
to capture the activity of a single entity and avoid the divided infringement complications that 
arise when a claim requires the actions of more than one party). 
 21. See, e.g., Truong, supra note 9, at 1918–19 (arguing that the loophole encourages actors 
to avoid infringement by entering into conspiracies to avoid liability). 
 22. Is it inefficient for a system to grant rights that cannot be enforced? Much of the 
literature often focuses on the acquisition of patents. But, it is actually at the enforcement stage 
where a patent’s value can be truly measured. See McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp. 
(McKesson), 98 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1281, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman, J., dissenting) 
(reasoning that a patent that cannot be enforced is not a patent right at all), rev’d sub nom. Akamai 
Techs. Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai/McKesson I), 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(en banc) (per curiam), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014).  
 23. See Kevin Rhodes, Comment, The Federal Circuit’s Patent Nonobviousness Standards: 
Theoretical Perspectives on Recent Doctrinal Changes, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1051, 1077–1100 
(1991).  
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infringement liability. Moreover, economic theory suggests that 
enforcing multi-party, interactive inventions promotes the economic 
function of the patent system.  
Few scholars have considered what enforcement of multiparty, 
interactive claims means for the patent system from an economic 
perspective. This Article is the first to attempt to understand the evolution 
of the doctrine of divided infringement as explained by prevalent 
economic theories of patent law. Identifying synergies between a court’s 
doctrinal test and an economic theory provides insight as to how courts 
view patent enforcement decisions. Further, identifying which economic 
theory seems to be most influential can assist in predicting how a court 
will decide patent infringement cases. Examining divided infringement 
through the lens of economic theory provides some answers to this 
interesting doctrinal puzzle and offers further considerations for policy 
makers interested in encouraging patent protection while discouraging 
overly broad patents from being enforced. 
Divided infringement is concerned with whether there can be 
infringement liability when multiple parties collectively perform each 
step of a method claim.24 Accordingly, divided infringement issues can 
arise with any technology that facilitates interaction between multiple 
components or multiple parties. For example, divided infringement raises 
particular problems for internet-age inventions.25 The very nature of the 
Internet—what makes it so powerful—is its interactivity. E-business 
transactions are now the norm.26 The sale of mobile devices has exploded. 
Further, manufacturers of old and new consumer devices are adding new 
features based on the ability to access and share information among 
electronic devices.27  
                                                                                                                     
 24. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 786 F.3d 899, 910 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(stating that “only method claims can raise an issue of divided infringement”), on reh’g en banc, 
797 F.3d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 612 F. App’x 617 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015). 
 25. See McKesson, 98 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1287 (Newman, J., dissenting) (fearing that 
the majority’s test for divided infringement would discourage “information-age” companies from 
seeking patent protection), rev’d sub nom. Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d 1301, rev’d, 134 S. Ct 
2111. 
 26. Harold C. Wegner, E-Business Patent Infringement: Quest for a Direct Infringement 
Claim Model, SOFTIC 2001 Symposium, at 4, available at http://patentlyo.com/media/docs/
2007/09/wegner-en.pdf (defining an e-business transaction as a transaction involving multiple 
parties that are interacting electronically with each other). 
 27. See Hari Gottpati, With iBeacon, Apple Is Going to Dump on NFC and Embrace the 
Internet of Things, GIGAOM (Sept. 10, 2013, 4:30 PM), http://gigaom.com/2013/09/10/with-
ibeacon-apple-is-going-to-dump-on-nfc-and-embrace-the-internet-of-things/ (explaining that the 
Internet of Things (IoT) technology allows beacons to transmit and receive information, including 
small files, from mobile devices in real time). Divided infringement will likely have an impact on 
recent applications of interactive technology such as the IoT. IoT technology will create new 
7
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However, when multiple parties are interacting electronically, their 
activities raise several challenges for a patentee with claims purporting to 
cover a system or method of implementing interactive technology. For 
example, the doctrine of divided infringement has made it difficult to 
determine whether many of the patents directed to internet inventions can 
be enforced. In addition, several companies have voiced concern about 
what impact divided infringement will have on personalized medicine, 
biotechnology, and other technology areas where parties seek process 
patents to protect innovation. What was once just a legal concern for 
client/server systems has now spread to everyday consumer devices.28 
Accordingly, hi-tech innovators continue to closely watch the 
development of the law in this area.29  
Because of its perceived impact on innovation, economists have 
studied and debated the merits of the patent system for decades. Many 
economists view the patent system as the most complex system for 
enforcing intellectual property rights.30 Economists such as Frank W. 
Taussig and A. C. Pigou have argued that such a complex system is not 
necessary to promote innovation.31 In contrast, other economists such as 
Jeremy Bentham, Jean-Baptiste Say, John Stuart Mill, and John Bates 
Clark asserted that patents and the patent system are necessary to 
encourage invention.32 Despite these differing views, legal scholars have 
relied on economic theories of the patent system to gain insight on 
procedural issues and patent rights enforcement.33 
This Article proposes that three economic theories of the patent 
system may provide some insight on divided infringement and 
enforcement of interactive patents. Specifically, this Article uses reward 
theory, prospect theory, and rent-dissipation theory to examine the issues 
                                                                                                                     
applications with the ability to communicate with devices interactively. Undoubtedly, 
companies—large and small—will file for patents on applications of IoT technology. 
 28. See Wegner, supra note 26, at 14 (setting forth an e-business model as a basic 
client/server system or service). 
 29. See generally Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc. (Akamai/Mckesson II), 
134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014) (reversing the Federal Circuit’s decision in Akamai/McKesson I). The 
Federal Circuit revisited the standard for direct infringement of interactive method claims and 
issued a per curiam opinion on August 13, 2015, in Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight 
Networks, Inc. (Akamai/McKesson III), 797 F.3d. 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 30. Steven N. S. Cheung, Property Rights and Invention, in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW & 
ECONOMICS 5 (1986). 
 31. See FRITZ MACHLUP, STUDY OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND 
COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 85TH CONG., 2D SESS., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW 
OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, STUDY NO. 15 (Comm. Print 1958) at 34. 
 32. Cheung, supra note 30, at 5. 
 33. See generally Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 
VA. L. REV. 305 (1992). 
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of divided infringement in a broader context. These theories are briefly 
summarized here and explored in further detail later in this Article.  
Reward theory holds that “patents are rewards to inventors for their 
completed inventions.”34 It follows that without a patent as a reward, 
inventors will not be encouraged to invest time and resources in 
developing new products and methods.35 Thus, reward theory prescribes 
certain formulas for the patent system.36 For example, reward theory 
recommends that the social benefit of granting an applicant a patent must 
outweigh the social cost of being subject to the resulting limited patent 
monopoly.37 With respect to doctrinal issues, from a reward theory 
perspective, the key question that must be asked to determine if an 
innovation is worthy of a patent is: Is this discovery worthy of a 
monopoly?38 While this provides an interesting view from a patentability 
perspective, reward theory’s ability to explain the outcome in patent cases 
has been called into question.39 
In response to his dissatisfaction with reward theory, Professor 
Edmund Kitch developed the prospect theory of patent law.40 Prospect 
theory proposes that “patents create property rights that facilitate the 
subsequent commercialization of inventions” and maximize their 
commercial value.41 In developing his theory, Professor Kitch drew an 
analogy to prospectors in the mineral claim system in the early American 
West.42 There, in response to receiving a basic mineral claim from a 
prospector, the government gave the prospector exclusive rights to 
develop a mineral claim free from competitive interference.43 Thus, the 
prospect theory of the patent system encourages the granting of patents 
at earlier stages and minimizes the chance that duplicative research 
efforts will occur.44 With respect to doctrinal questions, from a prospect-
theory perspective, the key question that must be asked to determine if an 
innovation is worthy of a patent is: Is this an area that should be further 
                                                                                                                     
 34. See Rhodes, supra note 23, at 1077. 
 35. ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 
131 (6th ed. 2012). 
 36. Rhodes, supra note 23, at 1077. 
 37. Id. at 1080. 
 38. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. L. & ECON. 
265, 284 (1977). 
 39. Id.; see also Grady & Alexander, supra note 33, at 305. 
 40. Kitch, supra note 38, at 266. 
 41. Rhodes, supra note 23, at 1085–86. 
 42. Kitch, supra note 38, at 271. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See Roger L. Beck, The Prospect Theory of the Patent System and Unproductive 
Competition, in 5 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 193, 194–95 (1983). 
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explored?45 Although prospect theory provides an interesting view of 
doctrinal patent questions—similar to reward theory—scholars have 
criticized prospect theory for lacking the ability to fully explain the patent 
system.46 
Rent-dissipation theory builds upon prospect theory in an attempt to 
create a theoretical framework that explains court decisions in patent 
cases.47 Accordingly, rent-dissipation theory is a direct result of some 
scholars’ belief that reward and prospect theory do not effectively predict 
the outcome of patent infringement cases.48 Specifically, Professor Mark 
Grady and Jay Alexander argued that the desire to limit rent dissipation 
is how actual patent cases are decided.49 Patent rents are extracted by 
inventors in the form of a monopoly and can be dissipated in several 
ways.50 For example, an inventor can dissipate patent rent by keeping his 
invention a secret instead of seeking patent protection. With respect to 
enforcement, rent-dissipation theory predicts that patents will be 
successfully enforced against infringing products that fall within the 
asserted patent’s signaled improvements.51 
Taken together, reward theory, prospect theory, and rent-dissipation 
theory represent a key framework for explaining the economic function 
of patents. In addition to shaping patent policy, these theories can help 
predict how courts decide patent cases. Viewing open doctrinal questions 
such as divided infringement as illuminated by these economic theories 
may provide additional insight into how the patent system should treat 
multiparty, interactive claims. The doctrinal challenges presented by 
divided infringement are briefly summarized below. 
Divided infringement is a problem specific to method claims because 
parties can, and often do, split the performance of method steps between 
themselves.52 The statutes setting forth contributory infringement and 
inducement broadly govern third party liability for patent infringement.53 
However, as evidenced by the Federal Circuit’s decisions, the claims at 
issue in divided infringement cases have revealed a legal gap between 
direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) and what type of behavior 
                                                                                                                     
 45. Kitch, supra note 38, at 284. 
 46. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 33, at 305. 
 47. Id. at 316.  
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 321 (“Rent dissipation theory predicts that the courts will enforce a patent when 
the size of the patent rent is proportionate to the rent dissipation that the invention’s technological 
signal would otherwise induce.”). 
 50. Id. at 308. 
 51. Id. at 309. 
 52. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai/McKesson I), 692 F.3d 
1301, 1305–06 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 895 (2014). 
 53. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).  
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is covered by contributory infringement and induced infringement in 
§ 271(b) and (c). 
For example, while the Federal Circuit set out a formulation for 
addressing divided infringement in Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. 
Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai/McKesson I),54 a unanimous Supreme 
Court in Akamai/McKesson II subsequently reversed that decision in 
2014, rendering that approach on divided infringement moot.55 In its 
opinion in Akamai/McKesson I, the Federal Circuit highlighted the 
“doctrinal problem” with § 271(a) and (b).56 Specifically, the court 
indicated that § 271(a) and (b) handled instances of infringement by a 
single actor well but fell short when the asserted infringement allegedly 
involved two or more actors.57 Past Federal Circuit precedent had 
imposed liability upon a defendant that did not perform all the claimed 
method steps under § 271(b) only if the defendant directed or controlled 
the actions of a third party to perform all or some of the remaining steps.58 
In Akamai/McKesson I, a divided Federal Circuit held, 6–5 in a per 
curiam opinion, that to sustain a finding of induced infringement, “all the 
steps of a claimed method must be performed.”59 However, the court 
found that there is no requirement that those steps be performed by a 
single entity.60 In other words, under the court’s short-lived rule, a 
defendant could be liable for induced infringement of a method patent if 
it induced other parties to perform some of the method steps and the 
defendant performed the remaining steps or if the defendant induced 
other parties to collectively perform the method steps.61 Thus, according 
to the Federal Circuit,  
liability for induced infringement [was] premised on a 
showing that (1) the alleged inducer knew of the patent, (2) 
it induced the performance of the steps of the method 
claimed in the patent or, alternatively, it performed some or 
all but one of the steps of the method claimed in the patent 
and induced another party or parties (including end-users) to 
perform the remaining step(s) of the claimed method, and (3) 
those steps were performed such that an actual infringement 
                                                                                                                     
 54. 692 F.3d 1301. 
 55. See Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc. (Akamai/McKesson II), 134 S. Ct. 
2111, 2117 (2104) (stating that the Federal Circuit’s partial-inducement test “fundamentally 
misunderstands what it means to infringe a method patent”). 
 56. See Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d at 1305. 
 57. Id. at 1306. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id.  
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occurred.62 
The opinion in Akamai/McKesson I63 is worth studying because it 
articulates three new and different views of how divided infringement 
liability should be determined. In Akamai/McKesson I, the Federal 
Circuit majority overruled its earlier decision in BMC Resources, Inc. v. 
Paymentech, L.P. (BMC Resource)64 and established a new partial-
inducement test for when more than one party performs steps in a method 
claim.65 The Akamai/McKesson I majority held that there could be 
liability for induced infringement where all the steps are not performed 
by a single entity.66  
Two dissenting opinions in Akamai/McKesson I provided alternative 
tests for divided infringement liability. In one dissent, Judge Richard 
Linn, joined by three other judges, argued that the control or direction test 
could provide for a finding of liability where there is a joint enterprise.67 
Notably, the Federal Circuit’s recent per curiam opinion closely follows 
Judge Linn’s dissent by incorporating the joint-enterprise test into the 
divided infringement analysis.68 In the second Akamai/McKesson I 
dissent, Judge Pauline Newman, writing for herself, argued that there 
should be liability for infringement whenever one or more parties perform 
the steps of a claimed method.69 Thus, there has been notable 
disagreement even within the Federal Circuit on how to determine 
liability for divided infringement of method claims. 
In reversing the Federal Circuit’s decision in Akamai/McKesson I, the 
Supreme Court relied upon precedent and its interpretation of the 
infringement statute. The Court specifically relied on its holding in Aro 
Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.70 to make it clear 
that liability for inducement can only arise if there is direct 
infringement.71 By itself, this statement was enough to reject the Federal 
                                                                                                                     
 62. See Driessen v. Sony Music Entm’t, 904 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1203 (D. Utah 2012), 
opinion vacated in part, modified in part, 2:09-CV-0140-CW, 2013 WL 4501063 (D. Utah Aug. 
22, 2013) (citing Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d at 1318–19). 
 63. 692 F.3d 1301.  
 64. 498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007), overruled by Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d 1301, 
rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014). 
 65. Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d at 1306.  
 66. See id. at 1308–09. 
 67. Id. at 1338 (Linn, J., dissenting).  
68.  See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai/McKesson III), 797 F.3d 
1020, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 69. Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d at 1322–23 (Newman, J., dissenting).  
 70. 365 U.S. 336 (1961).  
 71. See Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc. (Akamai/McKesson II), 134 S. Ct. 
2111, 2117 (2014) (citing Aro Mfg. Co., 365 U.S. at 341).  
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Circuit majority’s partial-inducement test.72 Importantly, the Supreme 
Court also acknowledged that the Federal Circuit’s current legal 
interpretation of the patent infringement statutes could permit a party to 
evade liability by splitting up performance of a method with another 
defendant.73 However, the Court declined to address the key question of 
whether multiple parties could directly infringe a method claim under 
§ 271(a). Instead, the Court remanded the case back to the Federal 
Circuit.74  
On remand, Judge Linn, writing for the majority, reestablished the 
direction or control standard first articulated in BMC Resources as the 
test for divided infringement liability.75 Further, Judge Linn expanded the 
factual circumstances of direction or control to include a joint 
enterprise.76 Most recently, the Federal Circuit (en banc) endorsed this 
approach.77 Accordingly, the controversy surrounding divided 
infringement will likely go on for several more years as district courts 
begin applying the most recent Federal Circuit test. 
The Federal Circuit’s struggle with divided infringement can be traced 
back to 2007. The first approach taken by the Federal Circuit was to hold 
that a “mastermind” infringer could be liable for the infringement of a 
multiparty claim if they directed or controlled the actions of the other 
infringing party or parties.78 This position was explained further by a 
subsequent opinion holding that “the control or direction standard is 
satisfied in situations where the law would traditionally hold the accused 
direct infringer vicariously liable for the acts committed by another party 
                                                                                                                     
 72. See id. at 2118 (stating that conduct that would be infringing in altered circumstances 
cannot form the basis for inducement). 
 73. See id. at 2120 (suggesting that the legal loophole could be due to the Federal Circuit’s 
interpretation of § 271(a) as articulated in Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318 
(Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 74. See id. (stating that the Federal Circuit will have the opportunity to revisit the definition 
of infringement under § 271(a)). 
 75. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 786 F.3d 899, 903–05 (Fed. Cir. 
2015), on reh’g en banc, 797 F.3d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 
612 F. App’x 617 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 76. Id. at 911 (defining a joint enterprise as “(1) an agreement, express or implied, among 
the members of the group; (2) a common purpose to be carried out by the group; (3) a community 
of pecuniary interest in that purpose, among the members; and (4) an equal right to a voice in the 
direction of the enterprise, which gives an equal right of control”). 
 77. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai/McKesson III), 797 F.3d 
1020, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 78. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P. (BMC Resources), 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007), overruled by Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai/McKesson I), 
692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014). 
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that are required to complete performance of a claimed method.”79 Later, 
in a third case, Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. 
(Akamai),80 the Federal Circuit again modified its position on the doctrine 
of joint infringement, holding that there could only be joint infringement 
in two cases: (1) “when there is an agency relationship between the 
parties who perform the method steps,” or (2) “when one party is 
contractually obligated to the other to perform the steps.”81  
Finally, in McKesson Technologies Inc. v. Epic Systems Corp. 
(McKesson),82 the last case to be heard before Akamai/McKesson I, the 
Federal Circuit settled on the following formulation: (1) “where the 
actions of multiple parties combine to perform every step of a claimed 
method, the claim is directly infringed only if one party exercises ‘control 
or direction’ over the entire process such that every step is attributable to 
the controlling party,”83 (2) “the ‘control or direction’ standard is satisfied 
in situations where the law would traditionally hold the accused direct 
infringer vicariously liable for the acts committed by another party that 
are required to complete performance of a claimed method,”84 and (3) 
“there can only be joint infringement when there is an agency relationship 
between the parties who perform the method steps or when one party is 
contractually obligated to the other to perform the steps.”85  
In sum, since 2007, the opinions of the Federal Circuit have revealed 
four primary categories of tests for determining divided infringement 
liability. This Article refers to the first category as the “mastermind suite 
of tests,” which was introduced in BMC Resources and Muniauction, and 
slightly modified in Akamai and McKesson. The remaining three 
proposed tests were introduced in the majority and two dissenting 
opinions issued in Akamai/McKesson I. These three tests include (1) the 
majority’s recently rejected partial-inducement rule, (2) Judge Linn’s 
joint-enterprise test, and (3) Judge Newman’s proposed all-steps rule.  
Given these four doctrinal categories, this Article uses the economic 
theories of the patent system to provide some insight on the issue of 
divided infringement liability. But several open questions remain with 
respect to divided infringement. If multiple participants each perform 
different steps of a method claim, would any of the participants be liable 
                                                                                                                     
 79. See Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008), 
overruled by Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d 1301, rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111. 
 80. 629 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 81. Id. at 1320. 
 82. 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 
463 F. App’x 906 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 83. Id. at 1283 (quoting Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1329). 
 84. Id. (quoting Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1330). 
 85. See id. at 1283–84 (quoting Akamai, 629 F.3d at 1320). 
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for infringement under direct inducement or contributory infringement?86 
Further, does the relationship between the multiple participants matter?87 
Finally, can there be liability for inducement in the absence of direct 
infringement?88  
A larger question this Article seeks to answer is whether interactive, 
multi-participant claims should be enforced at all. In response, this 
Article argues that the economic theories of the patent system support 
enforcement of multi-participant claims and are helpful in explaining the 
Federal Circuit’s search for a workable test.  
For example, reward theory asks whether the social benefit of 
enforcing a multiparty patent outweighs the social cost of multiple parties 
being subject to liability.89 The Federal Circuit’s answer to this question 
is yes, but only under certain circumstances. The control or direction test, 
partial-inducement test, and joint-enterprise test all attempt to define 
specific circumstances under which infringement liability could attach. 
In contrast, because it requires only that all the steps of a claim have been 
performed, Judge Newman’s all-steps proposal90 is the only test 
inconsistent with reward theory. Thus, as detailed later in the Article, 
reward theory is a useful doctrinal filter, but fails to help identify a 
specific path for divided infringement that would be most consistent with 
the economic view of the patent system. 
In contrast, prospect theory is a bit more helpful. Prospect theory asks 
whether a patentee should be free to further cultivate the claimed subject 
                                                                                                                     
 86. See McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 463 F. App’x 906, 907 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(citing Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983)) (“If separate 
entities each perform separate steps of a method claim, under what circumstances, if any, would 
either entity or any third party be liable for inducing infringement or for contributory 
infringement?”); see also Akamai Techs., Inc. v. MIT, 419 F. App’x 989, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(“If separate entities each perform separate steps of a method claim, under what circumstances 
would that claim be directly infringed and to what extent would each of the parties be liable?”). 
 87. See McKesson Techs., 463 F. App’x at 907 (“Does the nature of the relationship 
between the relevant actors—e.g., service provider/user; doctor/patient—affect the question of 
direct or indirect infringement liability?”). 
 88. See Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 895, 895 (2014) 
(granting certiorari to review Akamai/McKesson I). Limelight’s certiorari petition asked the 
Supreme Court to review: “Whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that a defendant may be 
held liable for inducing patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) even though no one has 
committed direct infringement under § 271(a).” Dennis Crouch, US Government Suggests That 
Supreme Court Reject Federal Circuit’s Divided Infringement Jurisprudence, PATENTLYO (Dec. 
12, 2013), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/12/us-government-suggests-that-supreme-court-
reject-federal-circuits-divided-infringement-jurisprudence.html.89.See Rhodes, supra note 23, at 
1080. 
 89. See Rhodes, supra note 23, at 1080. 
 90. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai/McKesson I), 692 F.3d 
1301, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting) (per curiam), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 
2111 (2014); id. at 1337 (Linn, J., dissenting). 
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matter free of interference from competitors. Both Judge Linn’s and 
Judge Newman’s tests enable a patentee to protect itself from competitors 
better than either the mastermind tests or the majority’s partial-
inducement rule.91 Accordingly, this Article finds that the two tests 
proposed by the dissenting judges in Akamai/McKesson I are most 
consistent with the prospect view of the patent system.  
Finally, this Article argues that the two positions advocated for by 
most of the Federal Circuit judges in Akamai/McKesson I are both 
consistent with rent-dissipation theory. Rent-dissipation theory suggests 
that patents will be successfully enforced against infringing products that 
fall within the asserted patent’s signaled improvements.92 The signaled 
improvement in the claims at issue in Akamai/McKesson I and in most 
internet-age inventions is the ability to facilitate collaboration and 
interactivity. Thus, rent-dissipation theory predicts that courts should 
enforce multiparty patents against infringement caused by partial 
inducement or the joint enterprise of others, since these collaborative 
activities fall within the patent’s signaled improvements. 
This analysis has some interesting implications. First, although 
rejected as policy making and as a judicial creation, the majority’s partial-
inducement test seems to be justified by economic theory. Moreover, the 
joint-enterprise test, first introduced by Judge Linn in his dissent in 
Akamai/McKesson I, is the test most consistent with the three economic 
theories of the patent system discussed here. Specifically, all three 
prevalent economic theories of the patent system predict that a court 
would employ Judge Linn’s joint-enterprise test. Accordingly, a 
theoretical economic analysis not only justifies the enforcement of 
interactive, multi-participant claims, but also seems to suggest that Judge 
Linn’s joint-enterprise test is consistently aligned with the economic 
goals of the patent system. 
A detailed discussion of the issues outlined above will proceed as 
follows: Part I of this Article discusses the practical impact divided 
infringement has on innovation. In that context, Part II summarizes the 
economic view of the patent system from a theoretical perspective and 
discusses three prevalent economic theories of the patent system. Part III 
explains the doctrine of divided infringement. In addition, Part III 
attempts to distinguish between the major doctrinal views concerning 
divided infringement. Part IV analyzes the Federal Circuit’s efforts to 
formulate a test for divided infringement through the lens of the economic 
theories discussed in Part II. Specifically, Part IV attempts to align the 
doctrinal perspectives identified in Part III with one or more of the given 
                                                                                                                     
 91. See id. at 1306 (majority opinion).  
 92. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 33, at 309. 
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economic theories of the patent system. The Conclusion proposes that 
economic theory justifies enforcement of interactive patents.  
In concluding that economic theory justifies enforcement of 
interactive patents, this Article finds theoretical support for the existence 
of interactive and multi-participant claims. Further, the economic 
theories discussed in this Article suggest that protecting multiparty, 
interactive inventions promotes the economic function of the patent 
system by encouraging the commercialization of interactive innovations 
and preventing unproductive rent-dissipating behavior by patentees or 
competitors. 
I.  A BRAVE NEW AND CONNECTED WORLD 
Although patentability issues seem to garner more attention from the 
media, divided infringement is also an important issue. Divided 
infringement affects established technologies as well as the cutting-edge 
applications of the future. Parties concerned with doing business via the 
Internet, financial services businesses, and companies specializing in 
personalized medicine all have drafted amicus briefs in several divided 
infringement cases. While their positions on the merits varied, it was clear 
that each party was concerned about the effect of divided infringement 
issues on their respective industries. In order to provide some practical 
context for the following theoretical discussion, this Part briefly describes 
some of the major classes of technologies impacted by divided 
infringement. 
A.  Internet-Age Inventions 
Divided infringement has a significant impact on internet-age 
inventions. In Akamai/McKesson I, Judge Newman expressed a 
preference for formulating a divided infringement test that would allow 
owners of internet-age inventions to enforce their patents.93 In contrast, 
some industry amici feared that too broad a liability standard would 
unnecessarily put all participants in an internet transaction at risk.94 
Internet-age inventions can be characterized as inventions that make 
use of the Internet and its associated technologies; they often necessitate 
and facilitate the participation of multiple parties. Specific applications 
                                                                                                                     
 93. See Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d at 1326 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The court should 
simply acknowledge that a broad, all-purpose single-entity requirement is flawed, and restore 
infringement to its status as occurring when all of the claimed steps are performed, whether by a 
single entity or more than one entity, whether by direction or control, or jointly, or in collaboration 
or interaction.”). 
 94. Brief of Amicus Curiae the Financial Services Roundtable in Support of Limelight 
Networks, Inc. and Affirmance at 16, Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d 1301 (Nos.2009-1372, 2009-
1380, 2009-1416, 2009-1417), 2011 WL 7730148 [hereinafter Financial Services]. 
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of internet-age technology include wireless technology,95 internet retail,96 
and financial services.97 The financial-services industry provides banking 
services to consumers98 who may buy or sell goods using an internet 
retailer.99 These industries have exploded in the last decade.100 Internet 
retail use continues to grow in the United States with approximately 192 
million users visiting, on average, over thirteen retail sites per month.101 
Financial services work globally to facilitate an estimated 10,000 
transactions per second quickly and in a secure manner.102 
Growth in demand for financial services and internet retail has been 
driven in part by innovation and explosive growth in the wireless 
industry.103 The United States has more mobile internet users than any 
other country in the world.104 “Apps,” or applications that run on smart 
mobile devices, have also contributed to the growth of the wireless 
industry.105 The revenue generated from mobile app sales was projected 
to increase 190% and surpass 15.1 billion dollars in 2011.106  
Accordingly, the global economy has become dependent upon this 
interconnected system of wireless devices, internet storefronts, and 
financial services.107 Different companies and different systems must 
interact to provide consumers with the services they have come to 
expect.108 For example, a credit card transaction can involve six or more 
participants.109 Therefore, different companies in different technology 
areas may partner to provide connected web services.110 Partnering is 
                                                                                                                     
 95. Brief of CTIA—the Wireless Association® and Metropcs Wireless, Inc. at 2, 
Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d 1301 (Nos. 06-CV-11109, 06-CV-11585), 2011 WL 4071472 
[hereinafter Wireless Association]. 
 96. Amici Curiae Internet Retailers’ Brief in Support of Defendant/Cross-Appellant’s En 
Banc Response Brief at 2, Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d 1301 (Nos. 2009-1372, 2009-1380, 
2009-1416, 2009-1417), 2011 WL 3796786 [hereinafter Internet Retailers]. 
 97. See Financial Services, supra note 94, at 3. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Internet Retailers, supra note 96, at 2. 
 100. Id. at 12.  
 101. Id. 
 102. See Financial Services, supra note 94, at 4. 
 103. See Wireless Association, supra note 95, at 3 (“Advances in wireless technology have 
enabled explosive innovation in the last decade. Ten years ago, consumers used cell phones almost 
exclusively to make voice calls. Five years later, they were texting, sharing pictures, and surfing 
the Internet.”). 
 104. Id. at 8 (stating that 234 million or more Americans use mobile devices). 
 105. Id. at 4.  
 106. Id. 
 107. Financial Services, supra note 94, at 4. 
 108. Wireless Association, supra note 95, at 2.  
 109. Financial Services, supra note 94, at 2. 
 110. See Wireless Association, supra note 95, at 7 (“A good example is Sprint’s partnership 
with Google and others to launch the Google Wallet app earlier this spring. This app provides a 
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more efficient for these companies and allows them to specialize, which 
can result in higher-quality service.111 
Due in part to the innovation taking place in this area, internet-age 
companies are targets of an increasing number of patent-infringement 
lawsuits.112 For example, wireless carriers may be sued based on methods 
that make use of their network.113 Internet retailers are also sued for 
patent infringement “based in part on the activities of their customers in 
visiting their websites.”114 Accordingly, due to the interactive and multi-
participant nature of internet-age technology, the issue of divided 
infringement is of deep concern to internet-age industry stakeholders. 
In sum, although the Internet is no longer “new,” internet-age 
technology and applications of that technology continue to grow. 
Stakeholders in this industry must provide technology and applications 
that facilitate communication between multiple participants. Thus, 
divided infringement is a concern for this technology area. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that stakeholders in this area are the frequent 
targets of lawsuits. The next Section summarizes personalized medicine, 
another technology area that has seen significant growth and an uptick in 
legal activity in recent years. 
B.  Personalized Medicine 
Similar to internet-age inventions, the doctrine of divided 
infringement can also have a significant impact on personalized medicine 
inventions. Personalized medicine is a relatively new field and includes 
a large number of small companies.115 The stakeholders in personalized 
medicine technology include pharmaceutical, biotech, and genetic 
companies, institutions, and organizations.116 These groups are also 
                                                                                                                     
‘wave and pay’ service through which consumers can pay at stores by simply waving their phones 
over a scanner. The phones use a near field communications (NFC) chip to communicate with the 
scanner. The service involved not only Google, but also Samsung (which incorporated the NFC 
chip in the phone), credit powerhouses Citi and MasterCard, merchant processing provider First 
Data, and Sprint to provide the necessary network connection.”). 
 111. Id. at 7. 
 112. Financial Services, supra note 94, at 12. 
 113. Wireless Association, supra note 95, at 10. 
 114. Internet Retailers, supra note 96, at 1. 
 115. See Corrected Brief of Amicus Curiae Myriad Genetics, Inc., in Support of Neither 
Party at vii, Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai/McKesson I), 692 F.3d 
1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam) (Nos. 2009-1372, 2009-1380, 2009-1416, 2009-
1417), 2011WL 3281836 [hereinafter Myriad Amicus Brief] (describing Myriad’s role in the 
personalized medicine industry). 
 116. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization in Support of Neither 
Party at 1, Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d 1301 (Nos. 2009-1372, 2009-1380, 2009-1416, 2009-
1417), 2011 WL 3281836 [hereinafter Biotechnology Industry Amicus Brief] (describing the role 
of biotechnology companies).  
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involved in the development of everything from agriculture applications 
to therapeutic healthcare products.117 
The therapeutic healthcare products rely heavily on diagnostic tests.118 
These tests are used to obtain information about a patient’s molecular and 
genetic markers119 associated with the risk of disease, the presence or 
absence of a disease, what a patient’s response will be to certain drug 
therapies, and other conditions.120 Using this information, healthcare 
providers can provide patient-specific preventive care and treatment 
regimens that reduce healthcare costs.121 
In order to provide these personalized services, the healthcare industry 
has pushed to become more efficient, and in doing so it has developed 
interactive systems and methods for performing certain processes.122 For 
example, it may be more efficient for one actor to perform diagnostic 
testing and another actor to correlate a marker detected during the 
diagnostic test with a disease or drug treatment.123 Similarly, new and 
innovative methods for medical treatment or drug delivery may require 
the participation of multiple healthcare providers and patients.124 
“Interactive” personalized medicine has several real-world 
applications. For example, the Prolaris® test diagnoses a prostate tumor 
and correlates that diagnostic information with a patient to help 
healthcare providers decide how to treat prostate cancer.125 Stakeholders 
in personalized medicine expect that similar applications—which allow 
users to store and manage healthcare data online and allow hospitals, 
insurance carriers, and healthcare providers to interact—will continue to 
grow.126 Moreover, future treatment and diagnostic methods will 
continue to involve multiple actors.127 
The doctrine of divided infringement is of particular interest to 
personalized medicine because “[t]he steps of biotechnology method 
patents are often capable of being practiced by separate entities.”128 
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Further, it is extremely time consuming and costly to develop 
personalized medicine applications.129 Generally, the industry can only 
protect this large investment of time and money by claims covering the 
diagnostic and correlation processes of a personalized medicine 
product.130 Personalized medicine stakeholders continue to develop novel 
and interactive methods for diagnosing and treating medical 
conditions.131 Accordingly, a divided infringement doctrine that is 
adverse to the personalized medicine industry could render thousands of 
patents useless and reduce the incentive to invest in expensive and time-
consuming research.132  
In sum, personalized medicine is a relatively new technology 
application that is interactive in nature. Stakeholders in this area are 
concerned about divided infringement because it has the potential to 
affect not only patented inventions but also whether new and inventive 
applications can be enforced.  
C.  The Internet of Things 
In addition to personalized medicine, the Internet of Things (IoT) is 
an emerging field with numerous interactive applications. The IoT is a 
platform of objects connected via a complex network.133 The IoT has 
slowly grown as more smart devices become connected to the Internet.134  
Several IoT technology stakeholders exist. They include, but are not 
limited to, integrated circuit manufacturers, manufacturers of sensing 
equipment, network providers, system integrators, and service providers 
in addition to customers and users of IoT services.135 What makes this 
platform appealing to technology stakeholders is its potential to facilitate 
human interaction with smart devices.136 For legal observers, it is the 
multi-participant, interactive nature of this new platform that makes it 
important for those concerned with divided infringement issues. 
Bruce Sterling, a science-fiction writer, popularized the idea of an 
IoT. His vision predicted that physical objects connected to the Internet 
would be traceable in space and time.137 In 2010, connected devices 
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outnumbered human beings. There were almost two connected devices 
for every one person.138 In 2015, it is estimated that there are 25 billion 
connected devices and only 7.2 billion people on the planet.139 
Technologies such as WiFi allow all these devices to connect and share 
information.140 Accordingly, Sterling’s vision is close to becoming a 
reality.  
Generally, the IoT is defined as an “infrastructure of networked 
physical objects.”141 This is a paradigm shift from the internet-age 
technology described above.142 Particularly, instead of simply facilitating 
human interaction, the IoT allows devices to interact with the physical 
environment, gather information from that environment, and share that 
information with other devices, people, or environments.143 Technologies 
and equipment—beyond the Internet itself—that provide the platform for 
the IoT include smart objects, information processing equipment, and 
device sensing equipment.144 
The Internet has allowed people and things to become interconnected. 
The true power of the IoT is allowing smart objects to interact and 
collaborate with each other.145 In other words, “devices are the users of 
the IoT network.”146 
Because of its possible application in many daily activities, the IoT is 
a tremendous growth area for innovation. New and innovative routing 
protocols are needed to allow smart objects to communicate in real 
time.147 Improvements need to be made in device-to-device 
communication.148 Further, there is an opportunity to create business 
models and business methods that will make use of the IoT platform in 
new and innovative ways.149 In sum, with the proliferation of connected 
devices, the IoT will affect every person in every walk of life.150 
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Stakeholders in IoT technology will most likely seek patents for their 
inventions. Thus, the doctrine of divided infringement should be a 
primary concern to patentees because of the interactive and collaborative 
nature of the IoT. The current state of the doctrine makes it unclear 
whether IoT multi-participant patent claims could be enforced. Some 
economic theories of the patent system may provide insight. Accordingly, 
the next Part begins with an explanation of how economists view the 
patent system and patent enforcement.  
II.  A THEORETICAL ECONOMIC VIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 
 This Part examines the economic theories and justifications offered 
by economists to support a system of patent rights. These normative 
theories offer a foundation to then evaluate the different legal standards 
created by the Federal Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court to decide when to 
enforce patent rights in claims of divided infringement.  
A.  Economics and Patent Rights 
 This Section first describes the basic foundations of patent rights and 
the patent system. It then shifts to focus on theoretical justifications for 
such a system.  
1.  The Nature of Patent Rights 
Intellectual property is inherently different in nature than real 
property. Economist Arnold Plant argued that instead of arising from 
scarcity, intellectual property rights created scarcity.151 That is, an 
intellectual property right creates scarcity in the idea, trademark, or 
artistic work it purports to protect.152 Economist Steven Cheung partially 
agreed with this sentiment but limited the scarcity idea to inventions that 
would be created absent a property right.153 While there is still some 
debate about its nature, there seems to be more consensus as to the 
impetus for intellectual property.  
The impetus for intellectual property law is to support individual 
creators.154 The intellectual property system is designed based on the idea 
that the best way to allocate intangible property is to assign control of the 
assets to individuals.155 With respect to patents, two primary justifications 
exist: (1) granting patents is justified because ownership in one’s creation 
is a natural right, and (2) granting a patent right to an individual also 
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 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 10. 
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benefits society as a whole.156 In turn, society recognizes the individual’s 
property right by allowing the owner to enforce its rights against 
others.157 
Several ideas exist concerning the question of what a patent right 
confers to its owner. According to one framework, a patent confers to an 
individual the right to “secure the enforcement power of the state in 
excluding unauthorized persons, for a specified number of years, from 
making commercial use of a clearly identified invention.”158 Economist 
John Commons argued that a patent right secured for its owner behavior 
in others subject to restraint of competition and control of supply.159 
Cheung asserted that a patent confers what he referred to as “production 
rights” and “development rights.”160 Production rights are the rights to 
use an idea to make a product.161 Development rights are the rights to use 
an idea to generate other ideas.162  
Another rationale for the existence of a patent right is that it provides 
an incentive to innovate.163 Inventors receive a monopoly in exchange for 
their secret inventions.164 It is in the public’s best interest to recognize 
patent rights because otherwise inventors may keep their inventions a 
secret.165 If important inventions are kept secret, it is difficult for the 
public as a whole to benefit.166 Further, inventors benefit from their 
disclosure by receiving exclusive rights that protect their inventions and 
those who invested in their research from normal competition.167 Thus, 
an overarching goal of the patent system must be to encourage and protect 
innovation.  
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2.  The Patent System 
The patent system is arguably the most complex system for protecting 
intellectual property.168 The English Parliament passed the Statute of 
Monopolies, which granted a trade monopoly to a first and true inventor, 
early in the seventeenth century.169 The British economist John Jewkes 
argued that the patent system survives into modernity because “there 
seems to be nothing better.”170 Similarly, economist Joan Robinson 
argued that there was no such thing as a beneficial patent system.171 
Despite some dislike for its complexity, there are widely accepted 
justifications for the patent system’s existence.172 
A primary justification for the patent system is that it stimulates 
invention. The views of scholars such as Bentham, Say, Mill, and Clark 
support the idea that granting patent rights is necessary to encourage 
invention.173 In addition, Plant argued that the patent system incentivizes 
research in areas that may not be profitable short-term.174 Economist A.T. 
Hadley takes a different view, arguing that the patent system incentivizes 
and protects those industries that would invest in and use new 
inventions.175 Bentham, Say, and Mill also viewed the cost of the patent 
system as nominal.176 Accordingly, in their view, society received the 
benefit of innovation at no cost.177  
In contrast, many scholars, particularly economists, have put forth 
cogent arguments against the patent system.178 Plant argued that, with 
respect to innovation, the market produces the most efficient result with 
or without the patent system.179 The patent system simply creates an 
artificial monopoly, which causes firms to divert resources to the 
production of inventions that may be arbitrarily patentable.180 This 
provides incentive for some firms to engage in inventive activity just for 
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the sake of obtaining a monopoly.181 Further, Plant believed that the 
patent system caused competitors to circumvent a protected idea rather 
than improve upon it.182 
Several economists have also voiced concerns about the cost of the 
patent system and the type of behavior it promotes. Taussig and Pigou 
argued that patents increase activity in areas useful to society, but do not, 
of themselves, stimulate inventive activity.183 Further, in contrast to the 
view of Bentham, Say, and Mill, Cheung argued that the cost of the patent 
system is great.184 For example, Cheung stated that the costs of activities 
associated with protecting patents—defining the idea or invention, for 
instance—inhibited innovation.185 In sum, Cheung argued that, without a 
clear idea of the rules for patentability and understanding of the 
enforcement mechanisms, it is pointless to argue about the value of the 
patent system.186 
B.  Economic Theory and Patent Enforcement 
Thus far Part II has discussed the view of the patent system from the 
perspective of economists. This Section discusses three specific 
economic theories of the patent system. 
1.  Reward Theory  
Reward theory holds that patents are rewards to inventors for their 
completed inventions.187 Generally, inventions are costly to make, and 
the idea behind the invention is difficult to control after the invention is 
disclosed.188 A patent allows an inventor to recoup the cost of developing 
the invention189 and to appropriate the full economic benefit of her 
invention.190 An inventor’s commercial benefit stems from a patent’s 
ability to exclude free riders.191 Thus, the patent (a form of limited 
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monopoly) is adequate compensation for the time and money an inventor 
invests in developing her invention.192  
One justification for reward theory is that giving an inventor a patent 
will stimulate more inventive activity.193 Without a patent, an inventor 
does not have enough incentive to invest in creating, developing, and 
marketing new products.194 Further, at least Bentham believed that 
offering a patent for disclosure of an invention was a good trade because 
the monopoly costs society nothing.195 But there are several criticisms of 
reward theory. One critique is that reward theory is an acceptable 
justification for the patent system but does not explain patent decisions.196 
For example, reward theory by itself cannot explain why some high-cost 
inventions do not receive patent protection while other less important and 
less-expensive-to-create inventions do receive patent protection.197 
Another critique of reward theory is that the benefit from being a 
“first-mover” in a market is a better reward than a limited monopoly.198 
Of course, this fails to take into account incremental inventions or 
improvements upon existing technology. Plant argued that exchanging 
property rights for inventions would lead to over-investment in 
inventions, which would be detrimental to society.199 Another criticism 
of reward theory relates to the cost to society of granting a patent,200 as 
in the higher prices that an inventor might charge for a good or service 
covered by the patent.201 
Despite these criticisms, reward theory prescribes a very specific 
framework for the patent system. Specifically, the theory says that the 
social benefit of granting a patent must outweigh the social cost of being 
subject to the resulting limited patent monopoly.202 One social benefit of 
a patent is that it encourages the public disclosure of new ideas, which 
leads to new inventions.203 The most costly patents under this theory are 
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inventions that cover a commercially successful product but represent 
only a minor advance in technology.204  
Reward theory is consistent with some existing principles of the patent 
system and would prescribe very different procedures for other aspects. 
For example, at least one author has suggested that under reward theory 
the patent term should be perpetual.205 More consistent with the current 
system, reward theory suggests that an invention disclosure must be 
sufficient to enable others to use the invention.206 In one area of interest 
to the Supreme Court, reward theory suggests that, due to patents’ high 
social cost, there should be a high standard for patentability.207  
Through a reward-theory lens, courts view the patent system as a 
trade-off between incentives and “output constraining effects.”208 With 
respect to doctrinal questions facing a court, this means that the key 
question that must be asked to determine if an innovation is worthy of a 
patent is whether the discovery is worthy of a monopoly.209 Accordingly, 
reward theory predicts that courts will grant and enforce patents that were 
induced by the patent system.210 However, whether reward theory 
predicts patent decisions or, more importantly, is an accurate predictive 
tool for how courts should rule is an open question. 
2.  Prospect Theory 
In response to his dissatisfaction with reward theory’s ability to 
explain some patent jurisprudence, Professor Kitch created the prospect 
theory of patent law.211 Prospect theory holds that patents create property 
rights that facilitate the subsequent commercialization of inventions and 
maximize their commercial value.212  
In developing his theory, Professor Kitch drew an analogy to 
prospectors in the mineral claim system in the early American West.213 
In this system, upon receiving a basic mineral claim from a prospector, 
the government gave the prospector exclusive rights to develop the 
mineral claim free from competitive interference.214 Professor Kitch 
argued that the patent system operated in a similar fashion by granting 
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inventors a patent that allowed them to commercialize their invention free 
from competitive interference.215 
The patent system performs a prospecting function in three ways. 
First, to encourage early filing, priority is given to the first inventor to file 
a patent application.216 Second, there is no requirement that the invention 
described in the patent application be commercially viable; thus, patents 
are issued long before commercial exploitation.217 Third, although 
specific embodiments can be included in the patent application, the 
invention is defined broadly by the patent claims in terms of a 
technological approach rather than a specific technology.218 
Further, “a patent ‘prospect’ increases the efficiency with which 
investment in innovation can be managed.”219 Under a prospect-theory 
view, a patent gives an inventor the exclusive right to develop and 
commercialize his inventions.220 One advantage of this approach is that 
rival inventors will not waste resources competing in areas already 
covered by the patent.221 The inventor may then invest in commercial 
development of the invention without the threat of competitors or free 
riders.222 Competitors in the marketplace are put on notice and can 
evaluate whether to license the patentee’s technology instead of wasting 
resources researching the same technology.223 In addition, having a patent 
lowers transaction costs involved in developing the new technology for 
an inventor, which results in efficient commercial development.224 
Finally, some commentators argue that prospect theory reduces the need 
for secrecy.225 
In contrast to reward theory—rewarding a patentee for what she has 
done—prospect theory suggests that the patent system reward inventors 
for what they have the potential to create commercially. Professor Kitch 
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argued that in areas of fast-paced technological advancement, the 
advantages of prospect theory become clear.226 Prospect theory relies on 
the notion that patents are granted early in the development of the 
innovation process to facilitate commercialization of the invention.227 
Because the patent system requires a disclosure before a patent can be 
granted, prospect theory suggests that the patentee must provide some 
context for the claims.228 The first-to-file regime of the patent office 
forces inventors to file an application on a version of the invention that 
will work, rather than on the finalized commercial product.229 
Under prospect theory—encouraging early filing—the bar for 
patentability must be set lower than under reward theory. Further, patent 
rights with strong commercial potential must be protected. Thus, the key 
question under prospect theory to determine if an innovation is worthy of 
a patent is whether the technological area covered by the patent should 
be further explored,230 or whether it contains information that needs 
further investigation.231  
Under this rubric, Professor Kitch has criticized the nonobviousness 
test for patentability as not as helpful to courts as some of the secondary 
factors that may be used to make a nonobvious determination.232 For 
example, one of the secondary factors for nonobviousness is commercial 
success. Prospect theory explains the commercial success requirement 
because under this theory, courts protect and enforce patents that cover 
an inventor’s investment to maximize the commercial potential of his 
invention.233  
Despite its insights, there are several criticisms of prospect theory. For 
example, Roger Beck criticized Professor Kitch’s characterization of the 
mineral rights system itself.234 Beck argued that Professor Kitch modeled 
his theory on a dysfunctional system.235 Beck also cited other patent 
procedures as unsupported by prospect theory, including the means for 
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applications to be amended, the time bar rule, and workability.236 A more 
practical criticism of prospect theory is that a patentee should not have 
the right to exclude others from using later discoveries.237 That is, a right 
to exclude should be granted to the patentee for what he has invented—
limited to what is described in the claims—not what he might develop or 
commercialize.238  
The critique of prospect theory most relevant to this Article is that the 
theory struggles to fully explain the behavior of the patent system after a 
patent has been granted. For example, Beck argued that granting an 
inventor a patent does not guarantee control and coordination over the 
commercialization of the innovation.239 Specifically, there is no legal 
support for the suggestion that a patentee can protect more than he has 
invented.240 Further, commentators argue that the central coordination 
theme of prospect theory does not explain how courts decide patent 
cases.241 Although prospect theory, like reward theory, provides an 
interesting view of doctrinal patent questions, scholars have criticized 
prospect theory for lacking the ability to fully explain the patent 
system.242 The last theory this Article summarizes—rent-dissipation 
theory—purports to provide a better explanation for the U.S. patent 
system as it exists today. 
3.  Rent-Dissipation Theory 
Rent-dissipation theory is a third economic theory that attempts to 
explain the patent system. Proponents of rent-dissipation theory suggest 
that it explains how courts decide patent cases better than either reward 
or prospect theory. Rent-dissipation theory predicts that courts will 
protect or enforce patent rights in a way that will discourage the 
dissipation of patent rents.243 Specifically, a patent right will receive 
protection when the “size of the patent rent is proportionate to the rent 
dissipation that the invention’s technological signal would otherwise 
induce.”244 Accordingly, rent-dissipation theory predicts that, given a 
patent’s disclosed technical information and its perceived value, the 
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 244. Id. at 321. 
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patent system will protect the invention as necessary to prevent the 
dissipation of the monopoly patent rent.245 
Rent-dissipation theory suggests that the patent system should seek to 
minimize the dissipation of patent rents,246 defined as the difference 
between the development cost of the innovation and what society would 
pay for the innovation.247 Patent rents are extracted by inventors in the 
form of a monopoly and can be dissipated in several ways.248 
Specifically, the patent system can cause rent dissipation by (1) 
encouraging redundant research efforts by competitors at the pre-
invention or development stage,249 (2) encouraging redundant 
commercialization efforts at the post-patent or improvement stage,250 or 
(3) encouraging inventors to keep their inventions a secret. 251 The patent 
system minimizes these various forms of rent dissipation through patent 
protection and enforcement mechanisms.  
Rent-dissipation theory suggests that the patent system should protect 
and enforce patents in a way that balances rent-dissipation effects at the 
development and improvement stages by varying the scope of protection 
afforded to patents on a case-by-case basis.252 Two factors that determine 
the scope of protection courts should afford a patent, according to rent-
dissipation theory, are the values of both the invention and its 
technologically signaled improvements.253 Protecting inventions that 
contain technological signals for a large number of improvements 
prevents rent dissipation at the improvement phase.254 If the patent 
signals that follow-on improvement can be made, then the scope of the 
patent should be broadened to prevent rent dissipation in improvement 
efforts.255 In the alternative, if the patent signals that improvement is 
unlikely, courts should give the invention narrower protections.256 
                                                                                                                     
 245. See id. at 320–21. 
 246. See id. at 308–09.  
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. See id. (arguing that when multiple inventors expend resources on redundant patenting 
efforts, the benefit to society is dissipated).  
 250. See id. at 316. 
 251. See id. at 316–18 (explaining that rent dissipation can occur at the invention or 
conception stage or at the improvement stage and that trade secrecy is another form of rent 
dissipation that provides justification for the patent system); see also id. at 308–09, 318 
(explaining that patent rents are also dissipated if inventors invest resources in keeping their 
inventions a secret out of fear that the patent system will inadequately protect and compensate 
them for their innovations). 
 252. Id. at 309, 317–18.  
 253. See id. at 319–21. 
 254. See id. at 320. 
 255. Id. at 318. 
 256. See id. 
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Valuable inventions confer a larger monopoly rent on inventors; thus, the 
more valuable the invention, the less protection it should receive in order 
to prevent rent dissipation at the development stage.257 Therefore, rent-
dissipation theory suggests that courts consider the value of an invention 
and its technological signals when deciding patentability and 
enforcement issues. 
Professors Grady and Alexander have argued that the desire to limit 
rent dissipation determines how actual patent cases are decided. The 
authors explained, “[r]ent dissipation theory predicts that the courts will 
enforce a patent when the size of the patent rent is proportionate to the 
rent dissipation that the invention’s technological signal would otherwise 
induce.”258 Accordingly, Professors Grady and Alexander describe a 
“hierarchy” of protection for patents.259 A patent with a small value but 
large improvement signal is likely to receive greater protection from the 
courts.260 Alternatively, an invention that is less likely to be improved 
upon and that has a large value is less likely to receive protection.261  
Rent-dissipation theory has interesting implications for the scope of 
protection afforded to a patentee. A patentee with broad protection can 
control the rent generated from improvements on the original 
innovation.262 Professors Grady and Alexander argue that courts protect 
broad patents when the patent signals that follow-on improvements can 
be made.263 By protecting such “pioneering inventions,” rent dissipation 
is discouraged at the improvement or modification stage.264 However, a 
broad scope of protection may result in waste at the pre-invention stage 
since it would increase the number of failed inventions that are 
developed.265 If the cost of these failed inventions outweighs the social 
benefit to society of giving broad protection to successful inventions, then 
too broad a scope of protection can also cause rent dissipation.266 Rent-
dissipation theory suggests that courts use the inventions’ perceived value 
and technological signals to balance scope-of-protection concerns.  
In an infringement suit, when a court enforces a patent, it is 
discouraging competitors from the rent-dissipating activity of improving 
upon the existing commercial embodiment. Rent-dissipation theory 
                                                                                                                     
 257. Id. at 321.  
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. at 320. 
 260. Id.  
 261. Id. at 321. 
 262. See id. at 307 (providing the example of Alexander Graham Bell and his invention of 
the telephone). 
 263. See id. at 318. 
 264. See id. 
 265. See id. at 307–08. 
 266. Id. 
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predicts that patents will be successfully enforced against infringing 
products or methods that fall within the asserted patent’s signaled 
improvements.267 Professors Grady and Alexander argued that the 
technological information disclosed in a patent signals improvement and 
that size of the rent an inventor can extract corresponds to the quality of 
the signaled information.268 Rent-dissipation theory predicts that if an 
alleged infringing innovation is not within a range of signaled 
improvements, patent protection will not be available because the patent 
is not a product of the rent-dissipating activity to improve the 
invention.269 Alternatively, a narrower scope of protection allows 
competitors to extract rent for improvements to the invention, placing the 
initial inventor at a disadvantage.270 The doctrine of equivalents is an 
example of a judicially created doctrine that adheres to rent-dissipation 
theory’s signaling idea. Professors Grady and Alexander cite Graver 
Tank & Manufacturing Tank & Manufacturing v. Linde Air Products271 
as recognition of the fact that a patentee’s invention may signal infringing 
equivalents.272 Thus, “[i]n the typical infringement case, a court need 
only apply hindsight to determine whether a second invention was within 
the signal of a patented device.”273  
In sum, rent-dissipation theory operates quite differently than reward 
or prospect theory. In contrast to reward theory’s focus on patent 
acquisition, rent-dissipation theory attempts to explain the patent system 
in both a pre-invention and commercialization context. The fact that rent-
dissipation theory takes into account a patent’s signaled improvements 
and perceived value sets rent dissipation apart from reward and prospect 
theory. However, the signaling idea put forward by rent-dissipation 
theory seems to ignore the fact that it is the claims that define the metes 
and bounds of the invention, not what is described elsewhere in the 
patent. Further, it is questionable whether patent value, as determined 
under the theory, is an accurate way of determining an invention’s value. 
Nevertheless, rent-dissipation theory attempts to account for these factors 
in response to the criticism that reward and prospect theory do not 
effectively predict the outcome of patent-infringement cases.274 Further, 
since rent-dissipation theory considers a patent’s technical disclosure, the 
theory may provide more insight about patent enforcement and 
infringement issues. 
                                                                                                                     
 267. See id. at 309. 
 268. See id. at 319. 
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 270. See id. at 307. 
 271. 339 U.S. 605 (1950). 
 272. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 33, at 348 (citing Graver Tank & Mfg., 339 U.S. 
605). 
 273. Id. at 320. 
 274. See id. at 316. 
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C.  Summary 
The economic theories of the patent system are a useful tool to explain 
patent law’s impact on inventors, innovation, and the commercialization 
of new technology. These theories suggest what types of inventions 
should be patented and how the courts should enforce patent rights. When 
patent law is consistent with economic theory, presumably the patent law 
is performing its economic function. Accordingly, analyzing the question 
of how the law should formulate a test for infringement of interactive 
method claims on the basis of economic theory may provide further 
support and insight into which proposals best support the economic 
function of the patent system. 
III.  A HISTORY OF DIVIDED INFRINGEMENT 
This Part discusses the various doctrinal approaches the Federal 
Circuit has considered with respect to divided infringement. Following 
this Part, this Article attempts to analyze the doctrinal approaches within 
a theoretical economic framework. But first, this Article provides a 
detailed analysis of the particular doctrinal approaches. 
Since 2007, various Federal Circuit judges have proposed four general 
categories of tests to determine if there should be liability for divided 
infringement. This Article refers to the first category of tests as the 
mastermind suite. These tests were introduced in BMC Resources, Inc. v. 
Paymentech, L.P. (BMC Resources)275 and Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson 
Corp. (Muniauction),276 and were modified in Akamai Technologies, Inc. 
v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai)277 and McKesson Technologies Inc. 
v. Epic Systems Corp. (McKesson).278 The remaining three tests were 
introduced in each of the three opinions issued in the en banc Akamai 
Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai/McKesson I)279 
decision. These tests include the majority’s partial-inducement rule, 
Judge Newman’s proposed all-steps rule, and Judge Linn’s joint-
enterprise expansion of the control or direction test. As of August 15, 
2015, Judge Linn’s view was adopted in part by the Federal Circuit en 
banc in Akamai/McKesson III.280 
                                                                                                                     
 275. 498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007), overruled by Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight 
Networks, Inc. (Akamai/McKesson I), 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam), 
rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014). 
 276. 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 277. 629 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
 278. 98 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Akamai/McKesson I, 692 
F.3d 1301, rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014). 
 279. 692 F.3d 1301. 
 280. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai/McKesson III), 797 F.3d 
1020, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam). 
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These approaches attempt to identify behavior that should invoke 
liability among multiple parties participating in steps that lead to 
infringement of a method claim.281 As of this writing, the Supreme Court 
has indicated that whether multiple parties can be liable for divided 
infringement is currently governed by the Federal Circuit’s Muniauction 
decision.282 Stated succinctly, direct infringement of a method patent 
occurs when all the claimed steps can be attributed to a single person.283 
In order to place this rule in the proper context, the following Sections 
briefly review the Federal Circuit’s divided-infringement 
jurisprudence.284  
A.  The “Mastermind” Suite 
Four Federal Circuit cases comprise what this Article refers to as the 
mastermind suite of tests. The rule extracted from these cases attempts to 
set forth three principles for how a method claim may be infringed when 
the actions of more than one party combine to perform every step of the 
method claim. First, “the claim is directly infringed only if one party 
exercises ‘control or direction’ over the entire process such that every 
step is attributable to the controlling party.”285 Second, “the control or 
direction standard is satisfied in situations where the law would 
traditionally hold the accused direct infringer vicariously liable for the 
acts committed by another party that are required to complete 
performance of a claimed method.”286 Third, “there can only be joint 
infringement when there is an agency relationship between the parties 
who perform the method steps or when one party is contractually 
obligated to the other to perform the steps.”287 The following Subsection 
discusses the first principle: the control or direction test. 
  
                                                                                                                     
 281. See Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1329–30. 
 282. See Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc. (Akamai McKesson II), 134 S. Ct. 
2111, 2119 (2014) (stating that the court “assume[s]” Muniauction is correct). 
 283. See id. at 2118. 
 284. Portions of this Section are adapted from this author’s previous articles: W. Keith 
Robinson, Ramifications of Joint Infringement Theory on Emerging Technology Patents, 18 TEX. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 335 (2010), Robinson, No “Direction” Home, supra note 3, W. Keith 
Robinson, A Case Study of Federal Circuit Policy Making, 66 SMU L. REV. 579 (2013). 
 285. See Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1329. 
 286. Id. at 1330 (citing BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P. (BMC Resources), 498 F.3d 
1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
 287. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai), 629 F.3d 1311, 1320 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010), rev’d, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 
(2014). 
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1.  A Mastermind Must Assert Control or Direction 
The Federal Circuit established a test for determining whether a single 
method claim could be infringed by the actions of multiple parties in two 
cases. In BMC Resources, the Federal Circuit held that, where multiple 
parties perform the steps of a method claim, the entire method must be 
performed at the control or direction of the alleged direct infringer.288 
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reasoned that if performance of every 
step of a claimed method could be attributable to a mastermind, the claim 
was infringed.289 Approximately one year later, in Muniauction, the 
Federal Circuit explained that the control or direction standard set forth 
in BMC Resources was met when “the law would traditionally hold the 
accused direct infringer vicariously liable for the acts committed by 
another party that are required to complete performance of a claimed 
method.”290  
The mastermind test was a response to defendants that avoided 
infringement liability by simply arguing that they did not perform all the 
steps of an asserted claim, and plaintiffs’ insistence that any relationship 
between multiple participants was enough to invoke liability. For 
example, in BMC Resources, the defendant, Paymentech, asserted that it 
did not infringe the claims because “it did not perform all of the steps of 
the patented method by itself or in coordination with its customers and 
financial institutions.”291 In response, BMC argued that the Federal 
Circuit’s decision in On Demand Machine Corp. v. Ingram Industries, 
Inc.292 altered the law controlling joint infringement by multiple 
parties.293 Specifically, BMC argued that the On Demand court “adopted 
a ‘participation and combined action’ standard as the type of ‘connection’ 
a plaintiff must show to prove joint infringement.”294 Under the On 
Demand standard, BMC argued that Paymentech infringed the asserted 
claims.295 
Paymentech was a financial transaction processing company that 
processed payment information collected by its merchant customers.296 
Paymentech provided this information to a debit network and to financial 
institutions.297 The financial institutions would then send information 
                                                                                                                     
 288. See BMC Resources, 498 F.3d at 1380–81. 
 289. See id. at 1381. 
 290. See Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1330. 
 291. BMC Resources, 498 F.3d at 1377. 
 292. 442 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 293. BMC Resources, 498 F.3d at 1378. 
 294. Id. at 1380. 
 295. Id. at 1378. 
 296. See id. at 1375–76. 
 297. Id. at 1376. 
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regarding the status of the transaction back to Paymentech.298 When 
BMC demanded that Paymentech license its patents, Paymentech filed a 
declaratory judgment action against BMC asserting that it did not infringe 
BMC’s patents—U.S. Patent Nos. 5,718,298 (the ‘298 patent) and 
5,870,456 (the ‘456 patent).299 The patents asserted by BMC purported 
to cover a method for processing debit transactions in the absence of a 
personal identification number (PIN) and required the participation of 
several entities,300 including a customer using a telephone, an interactive 
voice response unit for interacting with the customer, a debit card 
network, and a financial institution.301  
BMC asserted that “Paymentech directly infringed claim 7 of the ‘456 
patent and claim 2 of the ‘298 patent.”302 Claim 7 of the ‘456 patent 
depends on claim 6.303 Claims 6 and 7 are reproduced below: 
6. A method of paying bills using a telecommunications 
network line connectable to at least one remote payment card 
network via a payee’s agent’s system wherein a caller begins 
session using a telecommunications network line to initiate 
a spontaneous payment transaction to payee, the method 
comprising the steps of:  
prompting the caller to enter a payment number from one or 
more choices of credit or debit forms of payment;  
prompting the caller to enter a payment amount for the 
payment transaction;  
accessing a remote payment network associated with the 
entered payment number, the accessed remote payment 
network determining, during the session, whether sufficient 
available credit or funds exist in an account associated with 
the payment number to complete the payment transaction, 
and upon a determination that sufficient available credit or 
funds exist in the associated account, charging the entered 
payment amount against the account associated with the 
entered payment number, adding the entered payment 
amount to an account associated with the entered account 
number, and storing the account number, payment number 
and payment amount in a transaction file of the system.  
7. The method of claim 6 wherein said payment is a PIN-less 
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credit or debit card number.304 
Claim 2 of the ‘298 patent depends on claim 1.305 Both claims 1 and 
2 are reproduced below: 
1. A method of paying bills using a telephone connectable to 
at least one remote payment card network via a payee’s 
agent’s system, wherein a caller places a call using said 
telephone to initiate a spontaneous payment transaction that 
does not require pre-registration, to a payee, the method 
comprising the steps of: prompting the caller to enter an 
account number using the telephone, the account number 
identifying an account of a payor with the payee in 
connection with the payment transaction;  
responsive to entry of an account number, determining 
whether the entered account number is valid;  
prompting the caller to enter a payment number using the 
telephone, the payment number being selected at the 
discretion of the caller from any one of a number of credit or 
debit forms of payment;  
responsive to entry of the payment, determining whether the 
entered payment number is valid;  
prompting the caller to enter a payment amount for the 
payment transaction using the telephone;  
responsive to a determination that a payment amount has 
been entered and further responsive to a determination that 
the entered account number and payment number are valid, 
and during the call;  
accessing a remote payment network associated with the 
entered payment number, the accessed remote payment 
network determining, during the call, the account associated 
with the entered payment number to complete the payment 
transaction;  
accessing a remote payment network associated with the 
entered payment number, the accessed remote payment 
network determining, during the call, whether sufficient 
available credit or funds exist in an account associated with 
the entered payment number to complete the payment 
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transaction;  
responsive to a determination that sufficient available credit 
or funds exist in the associated account, charging the entered 
payment amount against the account associated with the 
entered payment number, adding the entered payment 
amount to an account associated with the entered account 
number, informing the caller that the payment transaction 
has been authorized, and storing the account number, 
payment number and payment amount in a transaction log 
file of the system during the call; and  
responsive to determination that sufficient available credit or 
funds do not exist in the associated account, informing the 
caller during the call that the current payment transaction has 
been declined and terminating the current payment 
transaction.  
2. The method of claim 1 wherein said payment number is a 
debit card number.306 
Considering the merits of the case, first the BMC Resources court 
explained that the jury instruction in On Demand had no bearing on the 
case before the court.307 Second, the court described the requirements for 
direct infringement liability. Specifically, the Federal Circuit explained 
that “[d]irect infringement requires a [single] party to perform or use each 
and every step or element of a claimed method or product.”308 Further, 
the court said that there could only be liability under indirect infringement 
if there was first a commitment of the entire act of direct infringement by 
one of the accused participants.309 
In the absence of a direct infringer, the BMC Resources court 
explained that a first party that controls the conduct of a second party is 
vicariously liable for the acts of the second party.310 In support of this 
principle, the court referred to other courts that faced divided 
infringement and “refused to find liability where one party did not control 
or direct each step of the patented process.”311 Thus, an alleged infringer 
could not avoid liability for direct infringement by having another party 
perform one of the claimed steps on its behalf.312 The Federal Circuit 
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reasoned that “[i]n those cases, the party in control would be liable for 
direct infringement. It would be unfair indeed for the mastermind in such 
situations to escape liability.”313  
Unfortunately, the control or direction test created a loophole. The 
BMC Resources court noted that parties could avoid infringement under 
the control or direction standard by entering into arms-length 
agreements.314 However, the court warned that “expanding the rules 
governing direct infringement to reach independent conduct of multiple 
actors would subvert the statutory scheme for indirect infringement.”315 
Thus, while the Federal Circuit acknowledged that “the standard 
requiring control or direction for a finding of joint infringement may in 
some circumstances allow parties to enter into arms-length agreements to 
avoid infringement,” the court opined that these concerns could be 
addressed by proper claim drafting.316 
Applying its control or direction test to the facts, the BMC Resources 
court observed that BMC’s claims implicated the participation of four 
separate entities.317 The court, however, found that there was no evidence 
that Paymentech controlled or directed its customers or the financial 
institutions it exchanged data with.318 Consequently, since Paymentech 
did not perform all the claimed steps or control or direct others to perform 
all the claimed steps, the Federal Circuit concluded that Paymentech did 
not infringe the claims.319 
Approximately one year later in Muniauction, the Federal Circuit was 
presented with another case in which a patentee asserted that the 
defendant was infringing the asserted patent under a theory of divided 
infringement.320 The patent at issue in Muniauction, U.S. Patent No. 
6,161,099 (the ‘099 patent), was directed to conducting an auction of 
financial instruments over a network using a web browser.321 Thompson 
owned the accused internet bidding process.322 Muniauction asserted that 
Thompson infringed claims 1, 2, 9, 14, 18, 20, 24, 31, 32, 36, 40, 42, 46, 
and 56.323 Claim 1 is representative and is reproduced below: 
1. In an electronic auction system including an issuer’s 
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 314. Id. 
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 316. Id. But see Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc. (Akamai/McKesson II), 134 
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computer having a display and at least one bidder’s 
computer having an input device and a display, said bidder’s 
computer being located remotely from said issuer’s 
computer, said computers being coupled to at least one 
electronic network for communicating data messages 
between said computers, an electronic auctioning process for 
auctioning fixed income financial instruments comprising:  
inputting data associated with at least one bid for at least one 
fixed income financial instrument into said bidder’s 
computer via said input device; 
automatically computing at least one interest cost value 
based at least in part on said inputted data, said automatically 
computed interest cost value specifying a rate representing 
borrowing cost associated with said at least one fixed income 
financial instrument; 
submitting said bid by transmitting at least some of said 
inputted data from said bidder’s computer over said at least 
one electronic network; and 
communicating at least one message associated with said 
submitted bid to said issuer’s computer over said at least one 
electronic network and displaying, on said issuer’s computer 
display, information associated with said bid including said 
computed interest cost value,  
wherein at least one of the inputting step, the automatically 
computing step, the submitting step, the communicating step 
and the displaying step is performed using a web browser.324 
Both parties acknowledged that Thompson did not perform all the 
steps of the claims.325 However, because the actions of the bidder could 
be attributed to Thompson as the auctioneer, the issue was whether 
Thompson infringed the claims.326 
Summarizing its decision in BMC Resources, the Federal Circuit 
described a multiparty spectrum for direct infringement.327 At one end of 
the spectrum, the Federal Circuit explained, “where the actions of 
multiple parties combine to perform every step of a claimed method, the 
claim is directly infringed only if one party exercises ‘control or 
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direction’ over the entire process such that every step is attributable to the 
controlling party, i.e., the ‘mastermind.’”328 At the other end of the 
spectrum, the court stated, “mere ‘arms-length cooperation’ [would] not 
give rise to direct infringement by any party.”329 Given this spectrum, the 
Muniauction court concluded that one situation in which the control or 
direction standard would be satisfied is “where the law would 
traditionally hold the accused direct infringer vicariously liable for the 
acts committed by another party that are required to complete 
performance of a claimed method.”330 
Next, the Federal Circuit analyzed the facts to determine whether 
Thompson would be vicariously liable for the acts of the claimed bidders. 
The court noted that Thomson did not perform every step of the method 
claims nor did it have another party perform the steps on its behalf.331 
Further, the court found the fact “[t]hat Thomson control[led] access to 
its system and instruct[ed] bidders on its use [was] not sufficient to incur 
liability for direct infringement.”332 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit 
found that Thompson did not infringe the asserted claims.333 
In sum, BMC Resources held that, where multiple parties perform the 
steps of a method claim, the entire method must be performed at the 
control or direction of the alleged direct infringer for liability to exist.334 
The Muniauction decision elaborated, holding that “the control or 
direction standard is satisfied in situations where the law would 
traditionally hold the accused direct infringer vicariously liable for the 
acts committed by another party that are required to complete 
performance of a claimed method.”335 As previously mentioned, the 
Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai 
Technologies, Inc. (Akamai/McKesson II)336 assumed that the holdings in 
Muniauction were correct while at the same time questioning whether 
“the Federal Circuit erred by too narrowly circumscribing the scope of 
§ 271(a).”337 In its August 2015 decision, Akamai/McKesson III,338 the en 
                                                                                                                     
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. at 1330. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. 
 334. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P. (BMC Resources), 498 F.3d 1373, 1380–81 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007), overruled by Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai/McKesson I), 
692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014). 
 335. Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1330. 
 336. 134 S. Ct. 2111.  
 337. Id. at 2117, 2119. 
 338. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai/McKesson III), 797 F.3d 
1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam). 
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banc Federal Circuit endorsed the control or direction test while also 
expanding it to impose liability for infringement due to a joint 
enterprise.339 Other Federal Circuit cases, discussed below, have 
attempted to impose further restriction on the mastermind idea by 
specifying what relationships might satisfy the control or direction test. 
2.  A Third Party Must Be Contractually Obligated to or in an Agency 
Relationship with the Mastermind 
In two cases after Muniauction, the Federal Circuit expanded on the 
idea that there must be a mastermind for multiparty infringement liability; 
it did so by attempting to identify the relationship that must exist between 
the mastermind and a third party. In Akamai, the Federal Circuit reasoned 
that the “control or direct” test must be read in the context of traditional 
agency law340 and that “direction,” no matter how explicit, is not an 
indicator of an agency relationship.341 Further, in both Akamai and 
McKesson, the Federal Circuit held that the actions of another party could 
not be attributed to the accused infringer in the absence of an agency 
relationship or contractual obligation.342 While both cases were 
eventually reheard en banc in Akamai/McKesson I and the doctrine 
further modified in a subsequent case,343 a brief review of the tests 
proposed in these earlier cases is useful.  
In Akamai, Akamai Technologies, Inc. and the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (collectively, “Akamai”) sued Limelight Networks, Inc. 
(Limelight) for allegedly infringing three patents directed to Akamai’s 
content delivery network (CDN) service.344 The district court granted 
“judgment as a matter of law, overturning a jury verdict of infringement 
by Limelight of claims 19-21 and 34 of U.S. Patent No. 6,108,703 (the 
‘703 patent’) and Akamai appealed to the Federal Circuit.”345 
In addition to owning patents that purported to cover CDN systems 
and methods, Akamai also provided CDN services.346 A CDN is created 
with several connected computers.347 It optimizes the delivery of 
                                                                                                                     
 339. Id. at 1022–23.  
 340. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai), 629 F.3d 1311, 1320 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010), rev’d, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 
(2014). 
 341. Id. at 1321. 
 342. Id. at 1320; see also McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp. (McKesson), 98 U.S.P.Q. 
2d (BNA) 1281, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d 1301, rev’d, 
134 S. Ct. 2111.  
 343. Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d 1301. 
 344. See Akamai, 629 F.3d at 1316. 
 345. Id. at 1314. 
 346. Id. at 1315–16. 
 347. See id. at 1315. 
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information over the Internet by storing embedded objects of a website 
across different devices in different locations.348 A content provider uses 
a CDN service to store and serve embedded objects of its website.349 The 
embedded objects are “tagged” with a URL so that they can be served to 
customers properly.350  
The two independent method claims asserted by Akamai at trial 
required a “tagging” step.351 Claim 19 is representative and is reproduced 
below with emphasis on the “tagging” step: 
19. A content delivery service, comprising: 
replicating a set of page objects across a wide area network 
of content servers managed by a domain other than a content 
provider domain; 
for a given page normally served from the content provider 
domain, tagging the embedded objects of the page so that 
requests for the page objects resolve to the domain instead 
of the content provider domain; 
responsive to a request for the given page received at the 
content provider domain, serving the given page from the 
content provider domain; and 
serving at least one embedded object of the given page from 
a given content server in the domain instead of from the 
content provider domain.352 
At trial and on appeal, Akamai relied on a theory of divided 
infringement and asserted that Limelight directed or controlled its 
customers to perform the tagging step in both method claims.353 In 
response, Limelight argued that it did not perform at least the tagging step 
and therefore did not infringe the asserted claims.354 Instead, Limelight 
required its customers to do the tagging.355 
In analyzing the facts, the Federal Circuit focused on when the acts of 
one entity could be attributed to another.356 The court reasoned that “the 
performance of a method step may be attributed to an accused infringer 
                                                                                                                     
 348. Id. at 1315–16. 
 349. Id. at 1316. 
 350. See id. 
 351. Id. 
 352. U.S. Patent No. 6,108,703 col.19 ll.6–20 (filed May 19, 1999) (emphasis added). 
 353. Akamai, 629 F.3d at 1318. 
 354. Id. at 1322. 
 355. See Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc. (Akamai/McKesson II), 134 S. Ct. 
2111, 2115 (2014). 
 356. See Akamai, 629 F.3d at 1319.  
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when the relationship between the accused infringer and another party 
performing a method step is that of principal and agent”357 or “when a 
party is contractually obligated to the accused infringer to perform a 
method step.”358 Considering the facts, the court found that Limelight’s 
customers were neither agents of, nor contractually obligated to, 
Limelight.359 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded that Limelight 
did not infringe Akamai’s asserted claims.360  
The technology at issue in McKesson also related to the Internet.361 
The defendant, Epic Systems Corporation (Epic), developed MyChart 
software, which allowed patients and healthcare providers to exchange 
healthcare information via a webpage.362 The plaintiff, McKesson, owned 
U.S. Patent No. 6,757,898 (the ‘898 patent) related to a method for 
sharing healthcare information via the Internet.363 McKesson alleged that 
Epic induced healthcare providers to infringe its patent.364 Claim 1 of the 
‘898 patent is representative of the claims asserted against Epic and is 
reproduced below: 
1. A method of automatically and electronically 
communicating between at least one health-care provider 
and a plurality of users serviced by the health-care provider, 
said method comprising the steps of: 
initiating a communication by one of the plurality of users to 
the provider for information, wherein the provider has 
established a preexisting medical record for each user; 
enabling communication by transporting the 
communication . . . ; 
electronically comparing content of the communication . . . ; 
returning the response to the communication 
automatically . . . ; 
                                                                                                                     
 357. Id. 
 358. Id. 
 359. Id. at 1320–21 (holding that Limelight’s control over customers was similar to the 
relationship in Muniauction, and thus there was no agency). 
 360. Id. at 1314, 1322. 
 361. See McKesson Info. Solutions LLC v. Epic Sys. Corp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88158, 
at *3–4 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 6, 2009). 
 362. See McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp. (McKesson), 98 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1281, 
1282 (Fed. Cir. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. 
(Akamai/McKesson I), 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 
2111 (2014). 
 363. Id. 
 364. Id. 
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said provider/patient interface providing a fully automated 
mechanism for generating a personalized page or area within 
the provider’s Web site for each user serviced by the 
provider; and 
said patient-provider interface service center for 
dynamically assembling and delivering customer content to 
said user.365 
In response, Epic argued that its customers (the healthcare providers) 
did not perform the “initiating a communication” step and that Epic did 
not exercise “direction or control” over the party that performed the 
“initiating” step.366 The district court agreed with Epic and granted its 
renewed motion for summary judgment.367 On appeal, the Federal Circuit 
set out to determine whether the relationship between the providers and 
users of MyChart was sufficient to attribute the initiating step to the 
MyChart providers.368 
Applying the agency or contractual obligation prong of the 
mastermind test set forth in Akamai, the Federal Circuit stated that the 
relationship between the MyChart healthcare providers and the MyChart 
customers was not an agency relationship, nor were the customers 
contractually obligated to the MyChart healthcare providers.369 
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit found that McKesson’s claims were not 
infringed.370  
In Akamai/McKesson I, the Federal Circuit reheard en banc both the 
McKesson and Akamai cases,371 and rejected the mastermind test.372 In 
the various opinions that ensued, the en banc panel introduced three new 
tests for divided infringement. These tests include the majority’s partial-
inducement rule,373 Judge Linn’s proposed joint-enterprise expansion,374 
and Judge Newman’s proposed all-steps rule.375 Since the Supreme Court 
recently rejected the partial-inducement rule,376 and the Federal Circuit 
                                                                                                                     
 365. U.S. Patent No. 6,757,898 col.44 l.60–col.45 l.24 (filed Jan. 18, 2000) (emphasis 
added). 
 366. McKesson, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283. 
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 369. Id. at 1284. 
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 371. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai/McKesson I), 692 F.3d 1301 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014). 
 372. Id. at 1306.  
 373. Id. at 1306, 1309.  
 374. Id. at 1350 (Linn, J., dissenting). 
 375. Id. at 1337–38 (Newman, J., dissenting).  
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2111, 2117–18 (2014). 
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recently revived the control or direction test in conjunction with the joint-
enterprise test,377 this area of law is in so much flux that it is instructive 
to explore each of these rules in detail. To begin, the next Section 
examines the partial-inducement rule and why the Supreme Court 
rejected it. 
B.  Partial Inducement 
In the Federal Circuit’s rehearing of Akamai/McKesson I, the majority 
departed from the mastermind tests discussed above and created a new 
test for divided infringement based on inducement. In issuing its opinion, 
the majority acknowledged that doctrinal problems arise “when the acts 
necessary to give rise to liability for direct infringement are shared 
between two or more actors.”378 In order to address these problems, the 
majority relied on the concept of induced infringement under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(b).379 
In previous cases, the Federal Circuit had held that a defendant was 
liable for infringement under § 271(b) only if the defendant directed or 
controlled another party to perform all the claimed steps.380 However, the 
majority in Akamai/McKesson I overruled this portion of BMC 
Resources.381 The Akamai/McKesson I majority specifically held that 
there could be liability for induced infringement where all the steps are 
not performed by a single entity.382 For example, a party could be liable 
under § 271(b) if it induced others to collectively perform the claimed 
method steps or performed some steps and induced others to perform the 
remaining steps.383  
The majority’s rationale for its partial-inducement rule came from 
several sources. Relying on the House Report on the 1952 Patent Act, the 
majority reasoned that inducement applies to divided infringement cases 
because “one who aids or abets infringement is likewise an infringer.”384 
Further, the decision asserted that analogies to imposing liability for 
induced infringement could be found in both criminal and tort law.385 In 
addition, the majority reasoned that § 271 defined different conduct as 
infringement that did not require a finding of infringement under 
                                                                                                                     
 377. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai/McKesson III), 797 F.3d 
1020, 1022–23 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam). 
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 380. See id. at 1306. 
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 383. Id. at 1309.  
 384. Id. 
 385. See id. at 1311–12. 
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§ 271(a).386 Accordingly, the opinion explained that an act of 
infringement under § 271(b) need not qualify as an act of infringement 
under § 271(a).387 Finally, in support of its inducement-only rule, the 
majority reasoned that an inducer has the same impact on the patentee 
whether inducing one party or multiple parties to infringe.388 
The Supreme Court rejected this approach. In reversing the Federal 
Circuit, Justice Samuel Alito wrote that the partial-inducement test 
“would require the courts to develop two parallel bodies of infringement 
law.”389 Instead, relying on Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top 
Replacement Co.,390 the Court clarified that liability for inducement can 
only arise if there is direct infringement.391 By itself, this statement was 
enough to reject the Akamai/McKesson I majority’s partial-inducement 
test.392 Importantly, the Supreme Court also acknowledged that the 
Federal Circuit’s legal interpretation of the patent infringement statutes 
at that time could permit a party to evade liability by splitting up 
performance of a method with another defendant.393 However, the Court 
declined to address the key question of whether multiple parties could 
directly infringe a method claim under § 271(a).394 Instead, the Court 
remanded the case back to the Federal Circuit.395 
The dissents in Akamai/McKesson I are important because they, in 
part, reflect the Federal Circuit’s most recent views on divided 
infringement. Both dissents harshly criticized the majority for making 
new policy.396 In response to the majority’s partial-inducement rule, 
Judge Linn argued in his dissent that inducement of a partial act that is 
not itself infringement is not inducement of any prohibited conduct under 
the act.397 Further, Judge Newman criticized the majority for creating 
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 387. See id. 
 388. Id.  
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49
Robinson: Economic Theory, Divided Infringement, and Enforcing Interactive
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
2010 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
additional opportunities for gamesmanship and abuse;398 Judge Newman 
interpreted the majority’s opinion as assigning liability solely to the party 
inducing infringement while exonerating the party that was induced.399 
C.  The All-Steps Test 
In Judge Newman’s Akamai/McKesson I dissent, she argued that 
infringement of an interactive method claim occurs when all of the 
claimed steps are performed regardless of how many parties are involved 
or the nature of their relationship.400 After having determined that there 
was infringement, Judge Newman proposed that liability for infringement 
by multiple parties should be assessed using tort principles of 
apportionment.401 The apportionment calculus would consider factors 
such as an entity’s relative contribution to the injury, the economic 
benefit received by the infringer, and the knowledge or culpability of the 
contributory infringer.402 According to Judge Newman’s rule, one or 
more parties infringe a method claim if all its steps are performed.403  
In the divided-infringement cases she has heard, Judge Newman has 
expressed strong opinions about affording internet-age patents the 
opportunity to be enforced. In McKesson, Judge Newman argued that the 
court’s agency or contractual obligation rule eliminated the incentive for 
inventors to pursue patents on interactive inventions.404 The rationale for 
Judge Newman’s rule was based, in part, on her belief that more than one 
participant can directly infringe a method claim.405 Further, Judge 
Newman’s test was based on the principle that an entity that wrongfully 
appropriates an invention violates the inventor’s patent rights.406 In 
support of her position, Judge Newman referenced the Federal Circuit’s 
approval of a jury instruction in On Demand.407 The jury instruction in 
On Demand provided that it was not necessary for acts of infringement 
to be performed by one person and that more than one person may be 
                                                                                                                     
 398. Id. at 1320 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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 400. Id. at 1326. 
 401. Id. at 1331. 
 402. Id.  
 403. Id. at 1337–38.  
 404. McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp. (McKesson), 98 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1281, 
1286–88 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman, J., dissenting) (questioning the court’s interpretation of 
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 405. See Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d at 1322 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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1344–45 (2006)).  
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jointly liable for patent infringement.408 Further, Judge Newman argued 
that the Akamai/McKesson I majority’s new rule created new problems 
for enforcement and compensation as well as “new opportunities for 
gamesmanship and abuse and inequity.”409 Judge Newman asserted that 
the majority focused only on the alleged inducer who would then be 
solely liable even if divided infringement were proven.410 
The overall principle guiding Judge Newman’s argument is that a 
patent right must afford its owner the right to exclude others from 
making, using, or selling the invention.411 Accordingly, the law 
eliminates the incentive for patenting if it does not impose liability when 
a patent is infringed by collaboration, joint action, or other cooperative 
activity.412 Thus, Judge Newman argued that infringement of an 
interactive method claim occurs “when all the claimed steps are 
conducted, whether by a single entity or in interactions or 
collaboration.”413 One could conclude then, that Judge Newman would 
find all the claims at issue in Akamai and McKesson I infringed. Then, 
under her apportionment solution, the only outstanding issue would be 
for a court to assess liability to all the parties involved in the infringement 
based on factors such as the relative contribution to the injury, the 
economic benefit received by the infringer, and the knowledge or 
culpability of the contributory infringer.414 In assigning liability in this 
way, Judge Newman argued, the damages attributed to so-called innocent 
actors would be insignificant.415  
D.  The Joint Enterprise 
In contrast to Judge Newman, Judge Linn argued that the “control or 
direction” test was the proper test for divided infringement liability.416 
Judge Linn relied on the Supreme Court’s statement in Aro 
Manufacturing that direct infringement must occur for there to be 
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contributory infringement.417 In addition to upholding the “control or 
direction” test, Judge Linn suggested expanding the idea of vicarious 
liability to include participation “in a joint enterprise to practice each and 
every limitation of the claim.”418 Judge Linn explained that a joint 
enterprise exists:  
when there is (1) an agreement, express or implied, among 
the members of the group; (2) a common purpose to be 
carried out by the group; (3) a community of pecuniary 
interest in that purpose, among the members; and (4) an 
equal right to a voice in the direction of the enterprise, which 
gives an equal right of control.419 
In rejecting the majority’s partial-inducement test, Judge Linn 
accused the majority of playing policy maker.420 The judge argued that 
Congress, given the recent enactment of the America Invents Act,421 had 
an opportunity to change the law, but since it did not, it must have been 
satisfied with the decisions in BMC Resources and Muniauction.422 Judge 
Linn asserted, first, that there cannot be contributory or induced 
infringement without direct infringement.423 Second, he defined direct 
infringement as only occurring when all the steps of a claimed method 
are practiced by a single entity, vicariously or via a joint enterprise.424 
Joint enterprises are individual participants who act together to infringe a 
patent.425 The acts of one member are imputed to the others, thus creating 
a separate infringing consciousness referred to as a joint enterprise.426 
According to Judge Linn’s dissent, an entity that participates in a joint 
enterprise to infringe a claim is liable as a direct infringer under 
§ 271(a).427  
Judge Linn’s expansion of the “control or direction” test to include a 
joint enterprise leads to a curious result. Based on this approach, Judge 
Linn’s dissent claims that the decision in Golden Hour Data Systems, Inc. 
                                                                                                                     
 417. See id. at 1340 (Linn, J., dissenting) (citing Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top 
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v. emsCharts, Inc.,428 where two parties each performed separate steps of 
a claimed method for their mutual benefit, should be overturned.429 In 
Golden Hour, the patent at issue—U.S. Patent 6,117,073 (the ‘073 
patent)—was directed to an integrated system for use in emergency 
medical transportation.430 The patent disclosed methods and systems for 
integrating services such as dispatch, clinical service, and billing data 
with the tracking of medical transports such as helicopters.431  
The accused infringers were emsCharts and Softtech. Defendant 
emsCharts produced a web-based program (also “emsCharts”) that stored 
patient information and provided billing services.432 Softtech made flight 
dispatch software (Flight Vector) that helped coordinate patient pickup 
and delivery, and provided flight-tracking capabilities.433 Softtech and 
emsCharts partnered together to enable their respective programs to 
complement each other, marketing and selling their programs as a unit.434 
In her dissent, Judge Newman characterized the relationship between 
emsCharts and Softtech as a strategic partnership to sell an infringing 
product.435 Further, the press release announcing their collaboration 
stated that “[t]his partnership allows emsCharts to combine their existing 
product line with Softtech’s CAD [Computer Aided Dispatch] 
technology, enabling them to deliver a complete pre-hospital data 
solution for Emergency Medical Services.”436 
Based upon this collaboration, Golden Hour accused emsCharts and 
Softtech of jointly infringing claims 1, 6–8 and 15–22 of the ‘073 
patent.437 Claim 15 is a representative method claim and is reproduced 
below: 
15. A computerized method of generating a patient 
encounter record, comprising the steps of:  
collecting flight information relating to an emergency 
transport crew dispatch;  
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collecting patient information from a clinical encounter 
associated with a patient incident requiring emergency 
medical care by the emergency transport crew; and  
integrating the patient information with the flight 
information to produce an encounter record indicative of the 
patient’s clinical encounter.438  
The jury found that emsCharts and Softtech had jointly infringed the 
asserted claims, and it awarded Golden Hour $3,500,000 in damages.439 
During a bench trial, the District Court overturned the jury verdict, 
asserting that neither emsCharts nor Softtech satisfied the direction or 
control test.440 On appeal, without much analysis, the Federal Circuit 
agreed with the District Court that there was no evidence that either 
emsCharts or Softtech directed or controlled the other to infringe Golden 
Hour’s claims.441  
If the District Court had applied Judge Linn’s joint-enterprise test, it 
would likely have led to a different result. Softtech and emsCharts agreed 
to work together. Their collaboration was for the purpose of providing 
customers with “a complete pre-hospital data solution for Emergency 
Medical Services.”442 Presumably, both companies would reap financial 
benefits from selling their integrated software. Finally, if there was no 
evidence that one party controlled or directed the other, one could 
conclude that emsCharts and Softtech had an “equal right of control” over 
their joint venture. Accordingly, under Judge Linn’s joint-enterprise test, 
the court would likely have found that emsCharts and Softtech infringed 
Golden Hour’s patents. Thus, the effect of Judge Linn’s joint-enterprise 
expansion is that it carves out a narrow opportunity for interactive claims 
to be enforced against certain active parties, while still protecting 
innocent actors from infringement liability. 
IV.  ECONOMIC THEORY AND ENFORCING INTERACTIVE PATENTS 
The divided infringement tests discussed above all attempt to balance 
the law’s interest in encouraging innovation with its obligation to enforce 
patents against those who misappropriate others’ inventions. Economists 
have proposed several theories that attempt to explain how to strike this 
balance. Economic theory can be a useful lens through which to view 
patent enforcement mechanisms. This Part offers an examination of the 
relationship between three prevalent economic theories of patent law—
                                                                                                                     
 438. U.S. Patent No. 6,117,073 col.21, l.54–col.22, l.6 (filed Mar. 2, 1998). 
 439. See Golden Hour, 614 F.3d at 1372 (majority opinion). 
 440. See id. at 1372–73. 
 441. See id. at 1380–81. 
 442. See id. at 1383 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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reward theory, prospect theory, and rent-dissipation theory—and divided 
infringement. It also considers whether divided infringement 
jurisprudence has progressed the way scholars might have predicted in 
light of the three economic theories and concludes that it has.  
A.  Stimulating Innovation 
Reward theory predicts that the patent system will implement a high 
standard for patentability and enforcement of patent rights.443 Thus, the 
relevant question under reward theory is whether the invention being 
asserted is worth the social costs of a monopoly.444 With respect to 
divided infringement, reward theory asks whether the social benefit of 
enforcing a multi-participant, interactive patent outweighs the social cost 
of subjecting multiple parties to liability.445 The Federal Circuit’s answer 
to this question is yes, but only under certain circumstances.  
Accordingly, in most of the divided infringement tests discussed 
supra, in addition to all of the claimed steps being performed, there is 
some other requirement that must be satisfied for liability to attach. 
Specifically, these tests are consistent with reward theory in only 
enforcing interactive claims where there is evidence of (1) a mastermind, 
(2) a joint enterprise, or (3) induced infringement. 
1.  The All-Steps Test Is Inconsistent with Reward Theory  
Judge Newman’s all-steps test seems to be inconsistent with reward 
theory. The test Judge Newman proposes for divided infringement states 
that infringement of an interactive method claim occurs when all of the 
claimed steps are performed, regardless of how many parties are involved 
or the nature of their relationship.446 In theory, Judge Newman’s test for 
divided infringement would probably make it easier for patentees to 
enforce interactive claims.  
However, this lower bar of patent enforceability is inconsistent with 
reward theory, which predicts that the patent system will implement a 
high bar for patentability and enforcement of patent rights.447 Thus, only 
inventions worth the social costs of a monopoly will be patented and 
enforced.448  
                                                                                                                     
 443. Rhodes, supra note 23, at 1080. 
 444. See Kitch, supra note 38, at 284. 
 445. See Rhodes, supra note 23, at 1080. 
 446. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai/McKesson I), 692 F.3d 1301, 
1326 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting) (per curiam), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 
(2014). 
 447. See Rhodes, supra note 23, at 1080. 
 448. See id. 
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Judge Newman has consistently argued that interactive claims 
covering internet-age inventions are worthy of a monopoly.449 And her 
divided infringement test imposes a lower standard for infringement than 
that articulated in § 271(a).450 Further, Judge Newman’s all-steps test 
advocates ignoring the single-entity doctrine and suggests that if one or 
multiple actors perform the steps of a claim, it is infringed.451 Most 
importantly, in the reward theory context, Judge Newman’s test assumes 
that the social benefit of all interactive method claims outweighs the 
social cost. Accordingly, Judge Newman’s test is inconsistent with 
reward theory because it does not help courts answer the key question of 
whether the interactive patent at issue is worthy of a monopoly. 
2.  Tests That Are Consistent with Reward Theory 
Reward theory predicts that any of the mastermind tests are acceptable 
for determining liability for divided infringement. This theory suggests 
that the patent system should impose a high bar to patentability and 
enforcement of patent rights.452 Thus, under the reward theory, courts 
have very little wiggle room in interpreting the patent infringement 
statute. 
The mastermind tests are the Federal Circuit’s attempt to define an 
exception to the single-entity rule for direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(a).453 The single-entity rule asserts that for a party to be liable for 
direct infringement of a method claim under § 271(a), that party must 
perform each and every step of the claimed method.454 Accordingly, 
under a rigid interpretation of § 271(a) and the single-entity rule, a party 
that performed only some steps of a claimed method would not be liable 
for infringement. Thus, the mastermind tests create a very narrow 
exception to the single-entity rule by expanding liability to a third party 
only when an agency relationship exists or there is a contractual 
                                                                                                                     
 449. See McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp. (McKesson), 98 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1281, 
1285–89 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman, J., dissenting) (questioning the court’s interpretation of 
precedent that resulted in the “single-entity rule” of infringement being held as an absolute rule 
of law and stating that the majority decision leaves interactive methods more susceptible to 
infringement), rev’d sub nom. Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d 1301, rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111. 
 450. See Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d at 1307 (majority opinion) (stating that “[t]his court 
has held that for a party to be liable for direct patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), that 
party must commit all the acts necessary to infringe the patent”). In contrast, Judge Newman’s 
test only considers when all of the steps are performed. Id. at 1326 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 451. See id. 
 452. See Rhodes, supra note 23, at 1080. 
 453. See supra Section III.A. 
 454. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P. (BMC Resources), 498 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007), overruled by Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d 1301, rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111. 
56
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 6 [2016], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss6/3
2015] ENFORCING INTERACTIVE PATENTS 2017 
 
obligation.455 By tailoring this exception narrowly, proponents of the 
mastermind tests are asserting that parties in these relationships are the 
equivalent of a single entity.  
Reward theory also provides insight as to how the patent system 
should balance the social cost and benefit of interactive claims. By 
making liability dependent upon the existence of rigid, legally defined 
relationships, the proponents of the mastermind tests are expressing their 
view that the social cost of enforcing interactive patents on society is 
high. However, reward theory would completely bar enforcement of 
interactive claims if they lacked value and social utility.456 To the 
contrary, evidence that two parties may have (1) contracted or (2) entered 
into an agency relationship to perform steps of a patented method 
suggests that the invention is valuable to society.457 A single party would 
not perform steps of a claimed method if they were not valuable in some 
way. Similarly, a party would not likely perform steps in conjunction with 
an agent or contractual partner unless the performance of those steps also 
provided value. 
Judge Linn’s expansion of divided infringement liability to include 
“joint enterprise” activities is also consistent with reward theory. Reward 
theory holds that an inventor should be able to recoup the cost of 
developing the invention458 and appropriate the full economic benefit of 
her invention.459 Judge Linn’s joint-enterprise test includes a pecuniary 
interest requirement.460 That is, for multiple parties to be liable for 
divided infringement, they must have a pecuniary interest in the 
performance of the infringing steps.461 Presumably, the pecuniary interest 
being appropriated by these multiple parties is covered by the patentee’s 
claims. Thus, the joint-enterprise test seeks to prevent a group of 
participants from appropriating a pecuniary benefit from practicing 
another’s invention.  
                                                                                                                     
 455. See McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp. (McKesson), 98 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1281, 
1284–85 (Fed. Cir. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d 1301, rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 
2111. 
 456. See Rhodes, supra note 23, at 1080 (explaining that the social benefit of granting an 
applicant a patent must outweigh the social cost of being subject to the resulting limited patent 
monopoly). 
 457. Cf. McKesson, 98 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1285 (noting that there must be an agency relationship 
or contractual obligation for liability to exist). 
 458. Rhodes, supra note 23, at 1078. 
 459. MERGES ET AL., supra note 35, at 131. 
 460. See Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d at 1349 (Linn, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 491 cmt. c (1965)).  
 461. See id. at 1349–50. 
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Further, reward theory also suggests that a patent must be able to 
exclude free riders.462 The joint-enterprise test requires that there be some 
agreement and common purpose among alleged infringing parties.463 
These requirements target parties that have agreed to benefit from the 
performance of a claimed method without licensing the invention. 
Therefore, Judge Linn’s joint-enterprise test is also an attempt to exclude 
free riders from benefiting from a patent without licensing the claimed 
technology.  
The joint-enterprise test also affirms that interactive claims are worthy 
of a monopoly.464 Judge Linn’s statement that the court’s decision in 
Golden Hour would be overturned under the joint-enterprise test465 and 
the Federal Circuit’s most recent en banc decision in Akamai/McKesson 
III466 are significant evidence that interactive claims are worthy of a 
patent right and should be enforced. Reward theory would predict that a 
court could use Judge Linn’s joint-enterprise test to determine divided 
infringement liability. 
Finally, the majority’s now rejected partial-inducement rule in 
Akamai/McKesson I is also consistent with reward theory.467 Reward 
theory predicts that courts will set a high bar for patentability and 
enforcement of inventions.468 Although it is less rigid than the “control 
or direction” test in BMC Resources,469 the partial-inducement rule is still 
a relatively high bar for enforcement of a patent. Under the partial-
inducement rule, a party that induces others to collectively perform 
claimed method steps, or that performs some of the steps and induces 
others to perform the remaining steps, is liable for infringement under 
§ 271(b).470 
The inducement rule is not as rigid as the other divided infringement 
tests discussed in this Article because instead of carving out a narrow 
exception to the single-entity rule, it avoids the single entity analysis 
                                                                                                                     
 462. Rhodes, supra note 23, at 1078. 
 463. See Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d at 1349. 
 464. McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp. (McKesson), 98 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1281, 
1286 (Fed. Cir. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d 1301 (“Interactive methods 
that meet all of the conditions and requirements of the Patent Act are fully entitled to participate 
in the patent system.”), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2010 (2014). 
 465. See Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d at 1349. 
 466. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai/McKesson III), 797 F.3d 1020 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 467. See supra Section III.B. 
 468. See Rhodes, supra note 23, at 1080. 
 469. See supra Subsection III.A.1. 
 470. See Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d at 1315, 1317–18 (majority opinion) (acknowledging 
that, with respect to method patents, parties can and often do share the performance of method 
steps between them). 
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altogether. Instead, the majority in Akamai/McKesson I relied on the 
requirements of § 271(b),471 which are generally well-defined and have 
been clarified recently by the Supreme Court.472 Inducement requires that 
a party have knowledge of the patent and encourage or aid others in 
performance of the claimed steps.473 Thus, the inducement-only rule still 
provides several hurdles for a patentee to contend with in order to 
successfully enforce his patent.  
Concerning the inducement-only rule, reward theory predicts that the 
social benefit of interactive patents outweighs the social cost if the patent 
can only be enforced against actors that have performed some of the 
claimed steps and have induced others to perform the remaining steps. 
The Federal Circuit’s effort to provide an avenue for enforcement of 
interactive patents under § 271(b) illustrates that the court was persuaded 
that interactive patents have social value. However, the majority 
incorrectly limited the costs on society of interactive patents by imposing 
rigorous evidentiary requirements on patentees. Specifically, under 
§ 271(b), in addition to showing that a party encouraged or aided in 
infringement, a patentee must also show that the accused party had 
knowledge of the patent.474 The knowledge requirement acts as a proxy 
for evidence of the social benefit of the interactive patent. Thus, under 
the partial-inducement rule, the social benefit of enforcing interactive 
patents is greater than the social cost if there is a clear indication that a 
party involved in the infringement finds the asserted patent of some social 
utility. 
Ultimately, reward theory provides an unclear picture of how the 
patent system should resolve the divided infringement problem. Take the 
facts of Golden Hour, for example. There, the two defendants—each 
selling separate software—enabled their products to work together to 
provide an integrated system for patient billing and emergency 
transportation logistics.475 The patentee asserted that the combined 
system jointly infringed its patent on a similar system.476  
Reward theory predicts that the patent in Golden Hour should be 
enforced if the social benefit of the patent outweighs the social costs.477 
That is, within the context of the tests discussed above, it should be 
                                                                                                                     
 471. Id. at 1307–09. 
 472. See Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc. (Akamai/McKesson II), 134 S. Ct. 
2111, 2117–19 (2014). 
 473. Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d at 1308. 
 474. Id. at 1312–13. 
 475. See Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (explaining that the defendants, emsCharts and Softtech, “formed a strategic partnership, 
enabled their two programs to work together, and collaborated to sell the two programs as a unit”). 
 476. See id. 
 477. See Rhodes, supra note 23, at 1080. 
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enforced where there is evidence of (1) direction or control, (2) a joint 
enterprise, or (3) induced infringement. Considering the mastermind 
tests, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that there 
was no evidence of direction or control.478 In contrast, Judge Linn argued 
that under his joint-enterprise formulation, the court would impose 
liability for infringement on the two defendants.479 Finally, it is unclear 
what the outcome would be under the partial-inducement test without 
further evidence regarding the parties’ interaction and knowledge of 
Golden Hour’s patent. Accordingly, the doctrinal tests that seem to align 
with reward theory lead to inconsistent results.  
In sum, it is difficult to use the tests that align with reward theory to 
predict how the courts should decide close cases like Golden Hour. 
Further, reward theory does not help one choose between the tests. At 
best, reward theory contemplates that some interactive claims are worthy 
of patent protection. The next Section discusses prospect theory, which 
provides a clearer picture of divided infringement. 
B.  Discouraging Misappropriation 
Prospect theory says that an inventor is granted a patent in order to 
cultivate the claimed subject matter free from the interference of 
competitors.480 This Article finds that the two tests first proposed by the 
dissenting judges in Akamai/McKesson I are most consistent with the 
prospect view of the patent system. Particularly, Judge Linn’s and Judge 
Newman’s tests enable a patentee to protect itself from competitors better 
than either the mastermind tests or the majority’s partial-inducement rule. 
1.  Tests That Are Inconsistent with Prospect Theory 
Prospect theory suggests that the law should minimize wasteful 
competition among potential patentees.481 By providing a mechanism for 
enforcement of interactive patents, the mastermind tests are facially 
consistent with the spirit of minimizing duplicative patenting and 
commercialization efforts. However, enforcing interactive patents only 
when there is evidence of a mastermind is not consistent with prospect 
theory’s goal of minimizing wasteful competition.  
Specifically, satisfaction of the mastermind tests occurs in such a 
limited set of conditions that wasteful efforts of competitors may not 
                                                                                                                     
 478. See Golden Hour, 614 F.3d at 1380–81. 
 479. See Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d at 1349 (Linn, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 491 & cmt. c (1965)). 
 480. See Kitch, supra note 38, at 276–77. 
 481. See McFetridge & Rafiquzzaman, supra note 218, at 100; see also Beck, supra note 44, 
at 207–09 (explaining that unproductive competition is a serious problem that includes premature 
invention, duplication, patenting of unnecessary substitutes, and excessive spending on research).  
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necessarily be minimized. For example, the Federal Circuit has stated that 
parties that entered into arms-length transactions to perform the steps of 
a method claim are often exempt from infringement liability.482 Further, 
until its 2015 en banc decision in Akamai/McKesson III,483 the Federal 
Circuit had never affirmed a finding of divided infringement liability 
under the “control or direction” test.484 This result effectively renders 
most interactive patents unenforceable under a mastermind approach. 
Unenforceable patents do not discourage competitors from either seeking 
patents on similar technology or producing competing products. 
Consequently, prospect theory would not suggest that a court impose a 
patent enforcement regime that leaves patentees unable to protect their 
inventions and subject to aggressive commercialization challenges from 
competitors.485  
For similar reasons, the partial-inducement rule is also inconsistent 
with prospect theory. At first glance, it would seem that enforcing 
interactive patents in cases where partial induced infringement occurs 
would minimize wasteful competition among competitors. However, as 
emphasized by Judge Newman in her dissent, relying on inducement 
introduces new opportunities for potential infringers to game the 
system.486 Further, the bar for showing induced infringement is so high 
that it may effectively weaken enforcement opportunities for interactive 
patents. 
Induced infringement is becoming harder to prove. The Federal 
Circuit has acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s holding in Global-
Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.487 raised the standard for proving 
inducement to require actual knowledge or willful blindness.488 Further, 
defendants in inducement cases have an additional defense available to 
them. Specifically, a good faith belief that a patent is not infringed is a 
defense to inducement.489 This means that very few patents can be 
enforced under the inducement-only standard. Thus, the inducement-only 
test will not minimize wasteful competition and is therefore inconsistent 
with prospect theory. 
                                                                                                                     
 482. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P. (BMC Resources), 498 F.3d 1373, 1380–81 
(Fed. Cir. 2007), overruled by Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d 1301, rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014). 
 483. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai/McKesson III), 797 F.3d 
1020, 1022–23 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 484. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Cascades Ventures, Inc. & VNS Corp. in Support of 
Plaintiffs-Appellants & in Support of Reversal, Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d 1301 (Nos. 2009-
1372, 2009-1380, 2009-1416, 2009-1417), 2011 WL 2323820 at *6. 
 485. See McFetridge & Rafiquzzaman, supra note 218, at 100.  
 486. See Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d at 1320 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 487. 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011). 
 488. See id. at 2068–69. 
 489. See Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015). 
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In sum, prospect theory suggests that the patent system should 
minimize wasteful competition by making it easier to obtain and enforce 
a patent than the reward theory provides. As demonstrated above, the 
partial-inducement rule and the mastermind tests set a high standard of 
enforcement that make it difficult to enforce interactive patents. 
Accordingly, both the partial-inducement and mastermind tests are 
inconsistent with the prospect theory of patent protection. 
2.  Tests That Are Consistent with Prospect Theory 
Judge Newman’s proposed all-steps test is consistent with prospect 
theory. Prospect theory suggests that the law should implement a lower 
bar to patentability and enforcement than what is required under reward 
theory.490 In Akamai/McKesson I, Judge Newman proposed simply that 
if all the steps of a multiparty claim are performed, then the claim is 
infringed.491 Judge Newman’s test provides a lower standard of 
enforcement than the partial-inducement or mastermind rules because it 
does not require evidence of any relationship between alleged joint 
infringers.  
Further, prospect theory explains that the patent system should grant 
and protect patent rights in a way that will minimize competition to 
commercialize patented inventions.492 By making it significantly easier 
to enforce interactive claims, Judge Newman’s test discourages a broader 
range of competitors from participating or investing in commercial 
activities that may infringe interactive patents. In turn, this minimizes 
wasteful and duplicative efforts among competitors. Thus, under a 
prospect theory view, it is likely that courts would use Judge Newman’s 
proposed test to determine divided-infringement liability. 
Similarly, Judge Linn’s joint-enterprise test is consistent with 
prospect theory. Prospect theory suggests that the patent system should 
grant and enforce patents in a way that allows inventors to commercialize 
their invention free from competitive interference.493 Parties of two or 
more that had an express or implied agreement to perform the steps of a 
claimed method would satisfy one or more elements of the joint-
enterprise test.494 Accordingly, under the joint-enterprise test, patentees 
could enforce multiparty claims against competitors who joined forces to 
appropriate the benefits of their invention.  
                                                                                                                     
 490. To compare the low bar of enforceability in the all-steps test, see supra Subsection 
IV.A.1. 
 491. See Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d at 1326 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 492. See McFetridge & Rafiquzzaman, supra note 218, at 100. 
 493. See id. 
 494. See Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d at 1349 (Linn, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 491 cmt. c (1965)). 
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Prospect theory also suggests that the patent system should enforce 
patents based on the technological approach rather than the specific 
technology.495 In the divided infringement context, this could relate to the 
idea that, for infringement liability, the court should be most concerned 
with whether the steps of a claimed method were performed rather than 
with which party performed them. Judge Linn’s rule is consistent with 
this idea in imposing liability if a joint enterprise practices each limitation 
of a claim. His rule is focused on the existence of an agreement to 
appropriate the claimed invention, rather than the specifics of how the 
patent was appropriated.496 Thus, parties who sought to avoid 
infringement by splitting up the performance of a claimed method would 
still be liable under Judge Linn’s joint-enterprise test.497 
Further, prospect theory says that the patent system should discourage 
wasteful competition in a patented area.498 Enforcing interactive patents 
against parties that act cooperatively to infringe the multiparty claims 
minimizes wasteful competition. Especially under a joint-enterprise 
regime, competitors are put on notice that if they act alone (as a single 
entity) or in conjunction with another entity, they will be held liable for 
infringement.499 The threat of liability discourages competitors from 
engaging in research or commercial activity in the relevant technology 
area. Accordingly, the patentee of the interactive method is in a better 
position to pursue commercialization efforts under a joint-enterprise 
theory of enforcement than under the mastermind tests. In sum, prospect 
theory predicts that a court could also use the joint-enterprise test to 
determine divided infringement liability. 
Prospect theory’s prediction is only unsatisfying in that it appears to 
recommend extremely different tests in this context. For example, 
prospect theory predicts that the patent at issue in Golden Hour should be 
enforced if the subject matter—an integrated patient billing and 
emergency dispatch system500—is an area that is worth exploring. In 
other words, is this an area that the patent system should allow a patentee 
to commercialize free from competitor interference? Under Judge 
Newman’s all-steps test, the patent would be successfully enforced 
because all the claimed steps were performed.501 Under Judge Linn’s 
                                                                                                                     
 495. See McFetridge & Rafiquzzaman, supra note 218, at 100. 
 496. See Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d at 1349 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 491 cmt. c (1965)).  
 497. See id. at 1350 (discussing liability even in instances of split-performance). 
 498. See Beck, supra note 44, at 207. 
 499. See Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d at 1350. 
 500. See Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). 
 501. See Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d at 1326 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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joint-enterprise test, the patent would also be enforced because there is 
evidence that emsCharts and Softtech worked closely together to create a 
system that infringed the patent.502  
In sum, both Judge Linn’s and Judge Newman’s proposed tests for 
determining divided infringement liability are consistent with prospect 
theory. Unfortunately, prospect theory does not help decide between the 
two tests. Accordingly, prospect theory is not much more helpful than 
reward theory in prescribing a specific doctrinal test. At best, it leads to 
the conclusion that the subject matter of interactive claims is worth 
exploring commercially and therefore worthy of some protection. The 
next Section discusses rent-dissipation theory and the insights it provides 
concerning divided infringement. 
C.  Minimizing Patent Rent Dissipation 
Rent-dissipation theory suggests that patents should be enforced 
against infringing products that fall within the asserted patent’s signaled 
improvements.503 The signaled improvement in the claims at issue in 
Akamai/McKesson I—and most internet-age inventions—is the ability to 
facilitate collaboration and interactivity between multiple parties. Thus, 
under rent-dissipation theory, the law should enforce interactive patents 
against infringement caused by collaboration or interactivity. 
1.  Tests That Are Inconsistent with Rent-Dissipation Theory 
The mastermind tests are inconsistent with rent-dissipation theory. 
Rent-dissipation theory suggests that the patent system should discourage 
the dissipation of patent rent at both the pre-invention and post-grant 
phase.504 Specifically, it suggests that the patent system should 
discourage duplicative efforts by competitors to patent and 
commercialize inventions.505 
The mastermind tests not only fail to prevent the dissipation of rent at 
the post-grant or commercialization stage, they encourage it. The 
mastermind tests require evidence of such a specific relationship between 
separate parties that even when an alleged infringing activity falls within 
a patent’s signaled improvements, it is difficult for a patentee to enforce 
his asserted patent. In fact, requiring evidence of an agency relationship 
or contractual obligation provides a clear roadmap for competitors 
seeking to avoid liability for infringement. The control or direction test 
                                                                                                                     
 502. See Golden Hour, 614 F.3d at 1371. 
 503. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 33, at 309. 
 504. See id. at 316, 321 (explaining that rent dissipation can occur at the invention or 
conception stage or at the improvement stage). Trade secrecy is another form of rent dissipation 
that provides justification for the patent system. Id. at 318. 
 505. See id. at 316. 
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has a similar effect. To avoid infringement, all competitors need to do is 
avoid legally entering into a contract with another or refrain from acting 
as if one party is directing or controlling the other. 
The mastermind tests also dissipate patent rents in another way. 
Inventors who cannot rely on the patent system to protect their inventions 
are more likely to keep their inventions a secret.506 Several amici in 
Akamai/McKesson I expressed concern that they could not continue to 
disclose their multiparty inventions because the control or direction test 
was proving too difficult to satisfy.507 This behavior is another way patent 
rent is dissipated and is strongly discouraged under rent-dissipation 
theory.508 Accordingly, rent dissipation suggests that courts should not 
use any test that relies on identifying a mastermind to enforce interactive 
claims. 
Similarly, Judge Newman’s all-steps test is inconsistent with rent-
dissipation theory. The goal of Judge Newman’s proposal is to clearly 
encourage patenting of internet-age inventions by making them easy to 
enforce.509 To that end, Judge Newman suggests that if one or more 
parties perform all the steps, the claim is infringed.510 Concerning 
liability, Judge Newman proposes that all parties involved in performing 
the steps of the asserted claim should be liable in varying degrees.511 
Since more patentees would be confident they could enforce their patent 
under Judge Newman’s all-steps test, they would also be more likely to 
create innovations related to internet-age technology.  
However, under a rent-dissipation analysis, Judge Newman’s 
approach may go too far. Specifically, because it almost guarantees that 
any and all interactive inventions can be enforced, competitors will be 
reluctant to enter into the subject market.512 With powerful and broad 
enforcement rights, most competition of any kind at the post-grant or 
commercialization stage is eliminated. In turn, Judge Newman’s proposal 
would likely cause a race among inventors to patent interactive 
inventions. Rent-dissipation theory suggests that a race to obtain 
powerful monopoly rights dissipates patent rents at the pre-invention 
                                                                                                                     
 506. See id. at 318.  
 507. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai/McKesson I), 692 F.3d 
1301, 1327, 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting) (per curiam) 
(discussing earlier cases that exemplify the difficulty in proving direction or control), rev’d, 134 
S. Ct. 2111 (2014).  
 508. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 33, at 318. 
 509. See supra Subsection IV.A.1. 
 510. See Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d at 1326. 
 511. See id. at 1331. 
 512. Judge Newman’s approach also seems to defeat the notice function of the patent system, 
which suggests that potential infringers be put on notice that they might infringe a patent. See id. 
at 1350 (Linn, J., dissenting). 
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stage and should be discouraged.513 Accordingly, rent-dissipation theory 
would not suggest implementing Judge Newman’s proposal since it 
would lead to rent-dissipating activity at the pre-invention stage. 
2.  Tests That Are Consistent with Rent-Dissipation Theory 
In contrast, the partial-inducement standard is consistent with rent-
dissipation theory.514 Rent-dissipation theory predicts that a patent will 
be successfully enforced when the alleged infringing product falls within 
the patent’s signaled improvements.515 An example of this principle is the 
court-created doctrine of equivalents. The doctrine of equivalents is a tool 
patentees may use to expand the coverage of their patent beyond the 
literal scope of their claims to cover equivalent means signaled by the 
claims.516 
In the divided infringement context, at least one of an interactive 
patent’s signaled improvements is the notion of collaboration. The ability 
to allow two or more parties to perform a claimed method in an interactive 
way that provides some value to all involved parties is an improvement 
over past methods that relied upon a single actor. The advent of connected 
homes, connected cars, IoT technology, and personalized medicine 
applications all support the notion that interactivity and collaboration 
between different parties may be innovative and have commercial 
value.517  
The partial-inducement standard acknowledges the possibility that 
different parties may combine their actions to complete the steps of a 
claimed method.518 Although the Supreme Court ultimately rejected it,519 
the partial-inducement rule demonstrated that the Federal Circuit’s 
thinking was shifting significantly away from strict adherence to the 
single-entity rule. The partial-inducement rule represents the Federal 
Circuit’s realization that interactive patents should be enforced against 
potential competitors seeking to appropriate the benefits of performing a 
                                                                                                                     
 513. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 33, at 308, 317 (explaining that multiple inventors 
expending resources on redundant patenting efforts dissipates the benefit to society). 
 514. See supra Section III.B. 
 515. Grady & Alexander, supra note 33, at 309, 321 (“Rent dissipation theory predicts that 
the courts will enforce a patent when the size of the patent rent is proportionate to the rent 
dissipation that the invention’s technological signal would otherwise induce.”). 
 516. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21, 40 (1997) 
(clarifying the scope of the doctrine of equivalents). 
 517. See discussion supra Part I. 
 518. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai/McKesson I), 692 F.3d 1301, 
1306 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 895 (2014), rev’d, 134 S. 
Ct. 2111 (2014).   
 519. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai/McKesson II), 134 S. Ct. 
2111, 2117–18 (2014). 
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claimed method. This prevents the dissipation of patent rent at the 
improvement stage. 
The joint-enterprise test is also consistent with rent-dissipation 
theory.520 Rent-dissipation theory discourages redundant commercialization 
efforts at the post-grant or improvement stage of the patent life cycle.521 
Protecting inventions that contain signals for a large number of 
technological improvements prevents rent dissipation at the improvement 
phase.522 One of the signaled improvements of multiparty claims may be 
interactivity—the exchange of information between people or things. For 
example, a multiparty claim may signal other possible components or 
users that could be integrated into a claimed system or method. Further 
integration could provide the system with more information or computing 
power, making the claimed method faster and more accurate. The joint-
enterprise rule clearly recognizes the advantages of different parties 
combining their actions to perform a claimed method.523 Rent-dissipation 
theory predicts that patents will be successfully enforced when the 
alleged infringing product falls within the patent’s signaled 
improvements.524 Accordingly, rent-dissipation theory suggests that 
Judge Linn’s joint-enterprise standard also prevents the dissipation of 
patent rent at the improvement stage. 
Rent-dissipation theory also encourages inventors to disclose their 
inventions.525 Judge Linn’s statement that the court’s decision in Golden 
Hour would be overturned under the joint-enterprise test526 is a signal that 
interactive claims cover inventions that should be disclosed and enforced. 
Thus, rent-dissipation theory would also predict that a court could use 
Judge Linn’s joint-enterprise test to determine divided infringement 
liability. 
The view of divided infringement through the lens of rent-dissipation 
theory is an interesting picture. The tests that align with rent-dissipation 
theory confirm that the signaled improvement of divided infringement 
claims is their ability to facilitate collaboration. Accordingly, in Golden 
Hour, rent-dissipation theory predicts that the patent at issue would be 
enforced if the infringing activity is a signaled improvement of the patent. 
Specifically, rent-dissipation theory predicts that the patent would be 
                                                                                                                     
 520. See supra Section III.D. 
 521. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 33, at 316. 
 522. Id. at 320. 
 523. See Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d at 1349 (Linn, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 491 cmt. c (1965)) (explaining that pecuniary interest may be a factor in 
determining whether there was a joint enterprise). 
 524. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 33, at 309. 
 525. See id. at 318. 
 526. Akamai/McKesson I, 692 F.3d at 1349. 
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enforced if there is evidence of a joint enterprise or one party inducing 
others to infringe. Thus, it is unclear what the outcome would be under 
the partial-inducement test without further evidence regarding the 
parties’ interaction and knowledge of Golden Hour’s patent. However, 
method claim 15 in Golden Hour would be enforced under a joint-
enterprise test because there is evidence that emsCharts and Softtech 
worked closely together to create a system that infringed the patent.527  
In short, both the joint-enterprise test and the now-defunct partial-
inducement rule for determining divided infringement liability are 
consistent with rent-dissipation theory. While rent-dissipation theory 
does not help one choose between the two tests, the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Akamai/McKesson II528 and the Federal Circuit’s 2015 
en banc decision in Akamai/McKesson III529 indicate that only Judge 
Linn’s joint-enterprise test is a viable option at the present time. Further, 
the guiding principle that can be gleamed from this analysis is that (1) 
one of the signaled improvements of interactive or multiparty claims is 
that of facilitating collaboration among multiple parties, and (2) under 
rent-dissipation theory, the patent system should enforce interactive 
patents against infringement related to this signaled improvement.  
D.  Summary 
The analysis of divided infringement under various economic theories 
of the patent system provides several interesting insights. Under reward 
theory, some interactive claims are worthy of patent protection. Further, 
prospect theory suggests that the subject matter of interactive claims is 
worth exploring commercially and therefore worthy of protection. 
Finally, it is possible that one of the signaled improvements of interactive 
or multiparty claims is facilitating collaboration—that the invention 
allows multiple parties to interact; thus under a rent-dissipation theory, 
the patent system should enforce interactive patents against products that 
fall within this signaled improvement. As a result, all three prevalent 
economic theories of the patent system justify the enforcement of claims 
susceptible to divided infringement in some way. 
However, no single theory provides a consistent doctrinal answer for 
how courts should determine liability for divided infringement. It is 
interesting to note that the doctrinal solution that seems to be consistent 
with all the economic theories discussed is Judge Linn’s joint-enterprise 
test. Judge Linn’s proposal to expand the idea of control or direction to 
                                                                                                                     
 527. See Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). 
 528. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai/McKesson II), 134 S. Ct. 
2111 (2014). 
 529. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai/McKesson III), 797 F.3d 1020 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam). 
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include a joint enterprise would promote the economic function of the 
patent system by (1) rewarding inventors, (2) encouraging the 
commercialization of interactive innovations, and (3) preventing 
unproductive rent-dissipating behavior by patentees or competitors. Now 
that the Federal Circuit has expanded the control or direction test to 
include Judge Linn’s concept of a joint enterprise, whether this standard 
is a workable one for district courts could be the subject of future 
research. One could certainly interpret the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Akamai as endorsing some form of multiparty infringement liability for 
collective action taken against a patentee.  
CONCLUSION 
The prevalent economic theories of the patent system provide an 
interesting insight into how courts enforce patent rights. With respect to 
interactive method claims, economic theory suggests that the law should 
enforce claims susceptible to divided infringement. However, three 
different economic theories of the patent system—reward, prospect, and 
rent-dissipation theory—provide differing views as to how the patent 
system should determine liability for divided infringement.  
Reward theory states that “patents are rewards to inventors for their 
completed inventions.”530 Under reward theory, interactive patents 
should only be enforced when their social benefit outweighs their social 
cost. Accordingly, any doctrinal test that predicates liability on more than 
just the fact that the claimed steps are performed aligns with reward 
theory. Under prospect theory, the patent system promotes the inventor’s 
ability to commercialize her invention free from direct competition.531 
Therefore, proponents of prospect theory would prefer an enforcement 
regime for interactive patents that is focused on discouraging competitors 
from misappropriating interactive inventions, leaving inventors free to 
commercialize their innovations. Finally, the goal of rent-dissipation 
theory is to reduce the dissipation of patent rents in the form of (1) 
redundant research efforts,532 (2) redundant commercialization efforts,533 
or (3) secret inventions.534 Rent-dissipation theory recommends an 
enforcement regime for interactive patents that will effectively reduce the 
dissipation of patent rents for truly innovative multiparty inventions. 
Each economic theory discussed predicts that the patent system 
should enforce interactive, multi-participant claims. However, the three 
theories do not provide a consistent suggestion for which doctrinal test 
                                                                                                                     
 530. Rhodes, supra note 23, at 1077. 
 531. See Kitch, supra note 38, at 276–77. 
 532. Grady & Alexander, supra note 33, at 308 (stating that when multiple inventors expend 
resources on redundant patenting efforts, the benefit to society is dissipated).  
 533. See id. at 316. 
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the patent system should employ to determine divided infringement 
liability. Each theory predicts that the patent system should employ a 
different set of doctrinal tests.  
At best, all three theories do seem to align in one way with Judge 
Linn’s joint-enterprise test. This Article finds that Judge Linn’s proposal 
to expand the idea of control or direction to include a joint enterprise 
promotes the economic function of the patent system by (1) rewarding 
inventors, (2) encouraging the commercialization of interactive 
innovations, and (3) preventing unproductive rent-dissipating behavior 
by patentees or competitors. Accordingly, although the doctrinal test for 
divided infringement will likely continue to evolve, start-ups and 
disruptive hi-tech companies who own interactive patents should find 
some comfort in the idea that enforcement of their interactive inventions 
finds support in the economic underpinnings of the patent system. 
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